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              This  paper  develops  a macroeconomic framework that captures 
linkages between aid, public investment, growth, and poverty. Public 
investment is disaggregated into education, infrastructure, and health, 
and affects both aggregate supply and demand. Dutch disease effects 
are captured by accounting for changes in the relative price of domestic 
goods. The impact of policy shocks on poverty is assessed by linking the 
model to a household survey. The model is calibrated for Ethiopia and 
changes in the allocation of aid and public investment are simulated. The 
amount by which foreign aid should increase to reach the poverty targets 
of the Millennium Development Goals is also calculated.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, the macroeconomic effects of foreign aid and public investment 
have been the subject of renewed attention by policymakers and development 
economists. Studies of the effects of foreign aid have focused, in particular, on the 
impact of external assistance on domestic savings, the government budget and fiscal 
policy, the real exchange rate, the level of private investment, the rate of economic 
growth, and more recently poverty and the incentives for reform in the recipient 
country. Fiscal response models for instance have been used to examine the impact 
of aid on taxes and government expenditure, that is, the degree of fungibility of aid 
(see for instance Franco-Rodriguez (2000), McGillivray (2000), and McGillivray and 
Ouattara (2003)). Some of these studies show that an increase in aid may lead to a 
decline in public savings through lower tax revenues, as governments reduce their 
tax collection effort.
1 Others find that shortfalls in aid—depending on its composition—
tend on the contrary to translate into shortfalls in domestic revenue (Gupta et al. 
(2003)), despite the fact that aid appears to be more volatile than domestic revenues 
(Bulir and Hamann (2003)).  Nevertheless, to the extent that foreign assistance may 
have adverse effects on incentives to collect taxes, keep public expenditure under 
control, or engage in reforms that may be politically costly, the issue of how to 
manage large aid flows becomes important. Svensson (2000) for instance argues 
that in a country where the government's incentives to undertake structural reform 
are subject to moral hazard problems, conditionality (or outright delegation of part of 
the aid budget to an external agency) may help to strengthen the impact of aid on 
poverty. 
 
Another line of research focuses on the Dutch disease effects of foreign 
assistance. The argument, essentially, is that if aid is at least partially spent on 
nontraded goods, it may put upward pressure on domestic prices and lead to a real 
                                                 
 
1See also the applications by Gang and Khan (1990), Khan and Hoshino (1992), Otim (1996), 
Mavrotas (2002), Mavrotas and Ouattara (2003), and the review by McGillivray and Morrissey (2001). 
A major limitation of these models, however, is their partial equilibrium nature—the impact of aid on 
public savings is often studied in isolation from the wider macroeconomic effects of aid (both direct 
and indirect) on output, prices, and the real exchange rate. As shown by White (1993), feedback   4
exchange rate appreciation. In turn, the real appreciation may induce a reallocation 
of labor toward the nontraded goods sector, thereby raising real wages in terms of 
the price of tradables. The resulting deterioration in competitiveness may lead to a 
decline in export performance and an adverse effect on growth.
2 It has also been 
argued, however, that if there is learning by doing (that is, endogenous productivity 
gains) and learning spillovers between production sectors, or if aid has a direct effect 
on public investment in infrastructure, then the longer-run effect on the real exchange 
rate may be ambiguous (see Torvik (2001) and Adam and Bevan (2003)).  
 
Yet another area of research in recent years has been the empirical link 
between aid and growth. In a contribution that has led to much subsequent 
controversy, Burnside and Dollar (2000) argue that foreign aid is effective in 
enhancing growth of GDP per capita only in countries with good fiscal, monetary, and 
trade policies. Using cross-country regressions for 56 developing countries over the 
period 1970-93, they find that aid has no impact on the rate of economic growth in 
countries with poor macroeconomic policies. In a recent update of their initial study, 
based on data for the 1990s, Burnside and Dollar (2004) argue that the evidence 
continues to corroborate their main conclusion—that the positive effect of aid on 
growth is conditional on having “good” institutions. 
 
However, a number of studies question the robustness of the dependence of 
the aid-growth link on the policy regime. Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) and 
Chauvet and Guillaumont (2003) find that although the marginal effect of aid on 
growth appears to depend on policies, as suggested by Burnside and Dollar, policies 
themselves depend on aid, whereas aid effectiveness depends also on the degree of 
economic vulnerability (measured as a function of long-term changes in the terms of 
trade and export instability) and domestic political instability. Dalgaard and Hansen 
(2001) find that the Burnside-Dollar results are very fragile. Five observations, which 
                                                                                                                                                         
effects may change significantly the conclusions of these models. An alternative approach, based on 
Vector Auto-regression methods, is proposed by Osei, Morrissey, and Lloyd (2003). 
 
2See Corden (1984) for a classic exposition, and van Wijnbergen (1986) for an early analysis 
related to sub-Saharan Africa. Yano and Nugent (1999) provide a more detailed discussion of the 
impact of foreign aid on the price of nontraded goods.   5
are excluded in Burnside and Dollar's “preferred” regressions, have a critical 
influence on the parameter of interest. They argue that aid appears to spur growth 
unconditionally (that is, regardless of whether policies are “good” or “bad”) but with 
decreasing marginal returns—perhaps as a result of gradually binding constraints on 
absorptive capacity. Hansen and Tarp (2001) find similar results. In addition, they find 
that when physical investment and human capital are controlled for, aid has no direct 
effect on growth but only an indirect one, through its impact on capital formation. 
Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2003, 2004), using a specification similar to 
Burnside and Dollar but with an extended sample, find that the interaction term 
between aid and policies is also insignificant. Moreover, Easterly (2003) and 
Roodman (2003) find that even in the same sample as Burnside and Dollar, the result 
is not robust to alternative (and equally plausible) definitions of aid, policies, and 
long-run growth. 
 
  The role of public investment in the growth process has also received much 
attention in recent years. In general, there are several channels through which public 
investment can affect growth (see Agénor (2004a, Chapter 12)). First, public 
investment (particularly in infrastructure) may increase private capital formation and 
thus the overall rate of accumulation of physical capital. But public investment may 
also displace private capital formation, and therefore reduce the economy’s capacity 
to sustain a higher level of output. Such crowding-out effects may occur if increases 
in public investment are financed through higher taxes (which may reduce the net 
rate of return on private investment, and therefore the incentive to invest) or by 
borrowing on domestic financial markets, thereby driving up domestic interest rates 
(thereby raising the user cost of capital) or leading to greater rationing in the quantity 
of credit allocated to the private sector. Second, public investment may affect output 
growth by influencing the rate of productivity growth, independently of its effect on 
factor accumulation. Physical capital may enhance the productivity of (skilled) human 
capital, if there is, as is often the case in practice, a high degree of complementarity 
between these factors. Similarly, if there is sufficient complementarity between the 
services produced by public capital in infrastructure and private physical capital, an 
increase in public investment outlays would not only lead to higher private investment   6
(as argued earlier) but would also make the existing stock of private capital more 
productive.  An important issue in this context, however, is the existence and 
magnitude of congestion costs, which imply that the productivity gains associated 
with a greater stock of public capital may diminish over time because the services 
produced by this stock are over-used.  As discussed later, this may be a particularly 
relevant consideration for public infrastructure (such as roads, for instance) which 
tends to get overcrowded due to the lack of alternatives. 
 
The evidence linking public investment to private capital formation and growth 
has grown significantly in the past few years. For instance, Milbourne, Otto, and Voss 
(2003), using an extended version of the Solow-Swan neoclassical model,  find 
evidence of a positive conditional correlation between public investment and 
economic growth in a sample of 74 industrial and developing countries. Aschauer 
and Lachler (1998), using cross-country growth regressions for a group of 46 
developing countries, find that public capital contributes significantly to productivity 
growth, as long as it is financed by lower current government spending—as opposed 
to a higher level of public debt (which may signal higher current and future taxation, 
or a future increase in the cost of borrowing). Ahmed and Miller (2000), using a 
sample of 39 industrial and developing countries for the period 1975-84, find that 
expenditure on social security and welfare reduces private investment (through the 
crowding-out effects alluded to earlier) in both groups of countries, whereas 
expenditure on transport and communication raises aggregate investment in 
developing countries. Bose, Haque, and Osborn (2003), using panel data for 30 
developing countries and an econometric methodology that explicitly accounts for the 
government budget constraint and possible biases arising from omitted variables, find 
that the share of government capital expenditure in GDP is positively and significantly 
related to income growth per capita, whereas current expenditure is insignificant. 
 
Belloc and Vertova (2004), using a vector error-correction approach, find a 
complementarity relationship between public and private investment, and positive 
effect of investment on output in 6 out of 7 HIPC countries. In a study of eight Latin 
American countries during the period 1980-95, Ramirez (2000) also finds that public   7
investment has a positive (albeit lagged) effect on private capital formation, 
suggesting a “crowding in” effect. In a subsequent contribution, focusing on nine 
countries in Latin America during the period 1983-93, Ramirez and Nazmi (2003) find 
that government consumption expenditure has a negative effect on both private 
capital formation and growth, whereas overall public investment, as well as public 
expenditure on education and health, have a positive effect on income growth per 
capita. Demetriades and Mamuneas (2000) find that public infrastructure capital has 
a significant positive effect on the demand for private inputs and the supply of output 
in a sample of 12 industrialized countries. Along the same line, Calderón and Servén 
(2002) argue that the lack of investment in infrastructure in Latin America (most 
notably in roads, telecommunications, and power generation capacity) relative to 
other developing regions during the past two decades had an adverse effect on 
productivity, production costs, and investment by the private sector, and dampened 
output growth. According to calculations performed by Rioja (2003), based on an 
endogenous growth model with public capital and maintenance expenditure, the 
long-run penalty imposed by poor infrastructure in the region is considerable—about 
40 percent of steady-state real income per capita. 
 
Few studies, however, have attempted to consider jointly the links between 
foreign aid, public investment, and growth. An exception is Lensink and White (2001), 
which dwells on Barro's (1990) assumption that (the flow of) government expenditure 
has a systematic, and nonlinear, effect on steady-state growth rates. Lensink and 
White extend Barro’s analysis by arguing that aid, to the extent that it leads to an 
increase in government purchases of goods—and hence a rise in the production of 
public services—has a positive effect on the recipient’s steady-state growth rates. 
However, they argue that this effect operates only at low levels of aid; beyond a 
certain threshold, aid has a negative impact on growth. The reason is that aid-
financed government expenditure may exert diminishing returns on private 
production, perhaps because of the congestion effects alluded to earlier. In another 
contribution, Chatterjee, Sakoulis and Turnovsky (2003) analyze the impact of aid 
tied to public investment in infrastrructure on private capital formation and growth, 
and show that the effect of this type of transfers on growth depends on the initial   8
stock of public capital. However, neither one of these contributions examines the 
composition of aid and its links with public investment, or Dutch disease effects, 
which may alter the long-run impact of aid and public investment on growth.   
Moreover, the models developed in these papers are parsimonious analytical tools, 
which are not designed to guide practical policy decisions. 
 
  This paper fills an important gap in the literature by developing a quantitative 
macroeconomic framework that captures the links between foreign aid, the level and 
composition of public investment, growth, and poverty, in the context of a “typical” 
low-income country. The model focuses on the fiscal and supply-side effects of aid, 
as well as the stock and flow effects of public investment, while accounting at the 
same time for potential congestion effects associated with the use of public services. 
It is designed to examine how increased aid and aid-funded levels of public 
investment, possibly coupled with changes in the allocation of public investment, can 
stimulate growth and lead to sustained poverty reduction.
3 At the heart of the model 
is a production function that accounts explicitly for the effect of public capital (in 
health and infrastructure) on output and the marginal productivity of private 
production inputs. Public capital in education also plays a role in the production 
process, because “raw” labor must be turned into educated labor to become 
productive. The domestic (composite) good is imperfectly substitutable with the 
foreign good. By accounting for changes in relative prices, the model allows us 
therefore to analyze potential Dutch disease effects associated with aid flows (as 
discussed earlier) in both the short and the long run.  In addition, the model captures 
explicitly the link between nonfood aid and public investment, and the possible 
adverse effects of large inflows of foreign aid on fiscal accounts (as emphasized in 
fiscal response models). Finally, although by its very nature the model is silent on 
distributional issues (only one aggregate household is accounted for), the impact of 
policy shocks on poverty is assessed either by linking the model to a household 
survey, or by using partial elasticities relating consumption growth to poverty, using a 
range of available estimates for low-income countries.   9
 
The model can be used to perform a variety of policy simulations that are of 
crucial importance for many low-income countries involved in building poverty 
reduction strategies supported by increased foreign assistance or debt relief. 
Moreover, these simulations can be performed in both a positive mode or a 
normative (programming) mode. For instance, by how much does private investment 
and growth per capita increase if the overall level of public investment rises by a 
given percentage of GDP, and at the same time the share of spending allocated to 
infrastructure increases? Or, by how much should foreign aid increase, in order to 
double the growth rate of income per capita, or for poverty to fall to the levels 
envisaged under the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) at the 
horizon 2015, that is, by 50 percent relative to 1990? To illustrate the functioning and 
properties of the model, we partly estimate it and partly calibrate it for Ethiopia—a 
country with one of the lowest per capita income in the world. We conduct various 
policy exercises to evaluate, as mentioned above, the impact of increases in aid-
funded levels of public investment on output growth rates and poverty in that country. 
We also conduct a “normative” exercise aimed at calculating the increase in nonfood 
aid that Ethiopia would require in order to reach the poverty goal of the MDGs in 
2015, given its initial conditions in 2002. We also consider a “big push” scenario, in 
which nonfood aid is increased by a large amount over a limited period of time. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the 
model. Section III presents parameter estimates and the calibration procedure for 
Ethiopia, and discusses trend-based projections at the horizon 2015. Section IV 
presents four sets of simulation results associated with changes in the level of aid, 
changes in the composition of foreign assistance between food and nonfood, a 
reallocation of government spending from current consumption to public investment, 
and a determination of nonfood aid levels consistent with achievement of the MDG 
poverty target. Section V summarizes the main implications of the analysis and 
discusses some research perspectives. 
                                                                                                                                                         
3More generally, foreign aid may lead to higher growth rates not only by leading to a direct 
increase in public investment and raising the level of the capital stock but also by increasing the   10
II. THE FRAMEWORK 
 
  The framework that we develop in this paper to study the links between foreign 
aid, government investment, poverty, and growth, is a one-sector, two-good model 
that accounts for the fiscal and supply-side effects of aid, as well as the supply- and 
demand-side effects of public capital formation. We begin by discussing the 
production side and the determination of labor supply and the capital stock.  We then 
examine components of aggregate demand (consumption, investment, and imports), 
the government budget constraint and the role of foreign aid, the balance of 
payments and the determination of the exchange rate, the equilibrium condition of 
the market for domestic goods, the savings-investment balance, and the procedure 
for assessing the effect of policy and exogenous shocks on poverty. 
 
1.  The Supply Side 
 
  The economy that we consider produces a single (composite) good that is 
imperfectly substitutable to an imported (composite) good. Domestic production 
requires land, in quantity LAND, educated labor, LE, private capital, KP, and public 
capital in health and infrastructure, KGhea and KGinf, respectively:   
 
Ys = Ys(LAND, LE, KP, KGhea, KGinf), 
 
where Ys is the supply of domestic goods. 
 
  The area of land allocated to production is a fixed input, and for simplicity we 
normalize it to unity. The introduction of public capital in infrastructure in the 
production function is based on the view that (cumulative) public investment in the 
economy improves the productivity of the private factors used to generate output, 
because it facilitates not only trade and domestic commerce but also the production 
process itself, as indicated earlier. Thus, our concept of public capital in infrastructure 
includes not only roads and public transportation that may increase access to 
                                                                                                                                                         
efficiency with which the existing stock is utilized.   11
markets, but also power plants and similar public goods that may contribute to an 
increase in the productivity of private inputs.   
 
  In order to account explicitly for differences in the degree of substitutability 
among the above set of inputs, we adopt a nested CES production structure. At the 
lowest level, the supply of educated labor, LE, and the stock of public capital in 
health, KGhea, are used to produce the composite input T, which we refer to below 
as “effective” labor: 
 
T(LE, KGhea, POP) = AT·[βT·LE
-ρT + (1 - βT)(KGhea/POP
θH)
-ρT]
-1/ρT,         (1) 
 
where POP is total population, θH ≥ , and σT = 1/(1+ρT) denotes the elasticity of 
substitution between LE and Kghea/POP
θH. The stock of public capital is divided by 
the size of the population to the power θH to account for congestion effects in the 
provision of health services. When θH = 0, these effects are absent.  Thus, our 
specification is consistent with the evidence suggesting that good health enhances 
workers’ productivity, as discussed for instance by Strauss and Thomas (1998). The 
introduction of public capital in health is also consistent with the empirical evidence 
provided by Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2001), according to which health, by 
improving the quality of human capital, has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on growth. 
  
Population itself grows at the constant exogenous rate, n: 
 
POP = (1+n)POP-1.                                                  (2) 
 
  At the second level, “effective” labor is used, together with private capital, KP, 
to produce the composite input J: 
 
J(T, KP) = AJ·[βJ·T
-ρJ + (1 - βJ)KP
-ρJ]
-1/ρJ,                              (3) 
 
where σJ = 1/(1+ρJ) is the elasticity of substitution between T and KP.   12
 
  At the third level, the composite input J and public capital in infrastructure, 
KGinf, are combined to produce output of domestic goods: 
 
Ys(J, KGinf, QUAL) = AY·[βY·J
-ρY + (1 - βY)(QUAL·KGinf/Ys-1
θI)
 -ρY]
-1/ρY,       (4) 
 
where θI  ≥ 0 and QUAL denotes an index of the quality of infrastructure, which is 
taken as given.
4 The lagged value of output, Ys-1, is introduced to capture congestion 
effects on public infrastructure capital. Such effects are absent when θI  = 0.
5 Thus, 
the positive impact that public infrastructure can exert on the marginal productivity of 
the composite input J can be highly mitigated if congestion effects are large or the 
quality of public capital is poor. A high degree of complementarity between the 
“quality-adjusted” stock of public capital in infrastructure and private inputs in the 
production process can be obtained by imposing a low value for the elasticity of 
substitution σY = 1/(1+ρY). 
 
  Educated labor is produced from “raw” labor, LR, which grows at the same 
rate as total population, n: 
 
LR = (1+n)LR-1.                                                     (5) 
 
The transformation of raw labor into educated labor, LE, requires an 
accumulation of skills that operates through a publicly-funded education system, 
which is free of charge.  The production function for newly-educated workers, LEN, is 
assumed to depend on the quantity of raw labor in the economy, LR, as well as the 
stock of public capital in education, KGedu, both in the previous period: 
 
LEN = AE·[βE·(LR-1)
-ρE + (1 - βE){KGedu-1/(LR-1)
θE}
-ρE]
-1/ρE,               (6) 
                                                 
4The index of quality of infrastructure capital could be endogenized by relating it to public 
expenditure on maintenance. This could be an important extension of the model, because it could help 
to identify possible trade-offs between “quantity” and “quality” of public capital, as discussed for 
instance by Hulten (1996). 
5Congestion of public capital in infrastructure could result from the size of the population as 
well. This could be easily captured by using a weighted average of Ys-1 and POP.   13
 
where σE = 1/(1+ρE) ≥ 0. The stock of public capital in education is divided by the 
term (LR-1)
θE in order to capture congestion effects in the education system due to 
overcrowded classrooms (see Agénor (2004b) for a formal analysis). The higher the 
quantity of raw labor that needs to be transformed into educated labor, the lower the 
contribution of the stock of government capital in education to the production of 
educated labor. If θE = 0, there are no congestion effects, and a higher quantity of 
raw labor only has a positive effect on the flow supply of educated labor. Otherwise, 
raw labor has an additional and indirect negative effect on LEN, and thus the supply 
of domestic goods. 
 
Given the flow equation above, the quantity of educated labor available in the 
economy is, at any given moment in time, 
 
LE = (1 - δE)LE-1 + LEN,                                           (7) 
 
where δE is the rate of depreciation, or “de-skilling,” of educated labor. 
 
  The allocation of domestic output between exports, X, and domestic sales, 




ρDE + (1 - βDE)DOM
ρDE]
1/ρDE,                          (8) 
 
where σDE = 1/(ρDE-1), with 1 < σDE < ¶ measuring the elasticity of transformation 
between exports and domestic sales. Standard efficiency conditions require the 
allocation of output between exports and domestic sales to be given by  
 
X/DOM = {(PX/PD)·[(1 - βDE)/βDE]}
σDE,                                 (9) 
 
where PD denotes the price of the domestic good (whose determination is discussed 
below), and PX the domestic-currency price of exports, given by   14
 
PX = ER·PX*,                                                     (10) 
 
where ER is the nominal exchange rate and PX* the world price of exports (assumed 
exogenous). Given the production function defined earlier (which determines Ys), the 
allocation function between exports and domestic sales can be used to determine X, 
and the identity  
 
PY·Ys = PD·DOM + PX·X,                                           (11) 
 
can be used to determine either PY or DOM. 
 
We also assume that wages are flexible, so that there is no open 
unemployment of educated labor. Alternatively, of course, one could assume a fixed 
wage (either in nominal or real terms), and thereby introduce the possibility of 
unemployment. Although it is well-known that the closure rule of the labor market can 
have a significant impact on policy simulations, we consider only flexible wages here. 
This is consistent with much of the evidence for the low-income countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, for which the model is designed (see, for instance, Bigsten and 
Horton (1998) and Dabalen (2002)).  In these countries, workers who are unable to 
find employment in the formal sector quickly move into the informal economy (given 
the absence of publicly-funded safety nets), where barriers to entry are low and 
wages are generally highly flexible. Note that the assumption of full wage flexibility 
does not preclude the existence of open unemployment; the reason is that raw labor 
is not instantaneously transformed through education, and only educated labor is 
used in the production process. As a result, open unemployment of raw labor, given 
by the quantity LR - LEN, may exist at any given moment in time. 
 
2.  Household Income and Consumption 
 
  All factor income accrues to a single, aggregate household. In addition, the 
household holds the totality of domestic public debt and receives interest payments   15
on it. It pays taxes, as well as interest on its foreign debt, and receives unrequited 
transfers from abroad. Thus, the household’s disposable income in nominal 
terms, Ydisp, can be defined as 
 
Ydisp = PY·Ys - TAX - RP*·ER·FdebtP-1 + RD·DdebtG-1 + ER*UTR$,       (12) 
 
where TAX denotes total (direct and indirect) tax revenue,
6 RP* the interest rate on 
private foreign borrowing, FdebtP the stock of private foreign debt, DdebtG the stock 
of domestic public debt, RD the interest rate on that debt, and $UTR the foreign-
currency value of private unrequited transfers (assumed exogenous). 
 
Total private consumption in real terms, CP, is defined as a function of 
disposable income and lagged consumption: 
 
CP = CP(Ydisp/PQ, CP-1),                                         (13) 
 
where PQ is the composite market price. 
 
To allocate domestic demand between domestic and imported goods, we use 
the standard Armington assumption.
7 Total demand for goods sold on the domestic 
market (which includes both imports and domestically-produced goods), Qd, is 
defined as the sum of private and public spending on consumption and investment: 
 
Qd = (CP+CG) + (IP+IG),                                           (14) 
 
where CG and IG denote real government spending on consumption and investment 
and IP private investment. 
 
                                                 
6In principle, of course, only direct taxes should appear in the definition of disposable income. 
We nevertheless use a broader definition here, given that we do not model fully the composition of tax 
revenues. As a result, we also do not account for the effect of indirect taxes on the price of sales on 
the domestic market. 
7See Winters (1984) for a discussion of the limitations of the Armington specification.   16
  Total demand for goods sold domestically is allocated between demand for 
domestically-produced goods, DOM, and demand for imported goods, M, using a 
CES demand function with an elasticity of substitution of σDM: 
 
M/DOM = {(PD/PM)·[(1 - βDM)/βDM]}
σ
DM,                              (15) 
 
where PM is defined as the product of the nominal exchange rate, ER, and the world 
price of imports, PM* (assumed exogenous), inclusive of tariffs: 
 
PM = (1+tm)·ER·PM*,                                              (16) 
 
and 0 < tm < 1 is the tariff rate. 
 
  The stock of private capital evolves over time according to 
 
KP = IP-1 + (1 - δP)·KP-1,                                           (17) 
 
where δP is a constant rate of depreciation. 
 
3.  Government Budget and Foreign Aid 
 
  The government collects taxes (on income, imports, and domestic sales), and 
spends on goods and services (including for maintenance purposes). It also services 
its domestic and foreign debt, and invests in education, health, and infrastructure. It 
receives foreign assistance, which takes two forms: food aid and nonfood aid. Both 
components are treated as a source of revenue for the government, but in addition 
food aid is assumed sold on local markets at face value. The deficit is financed by 
domestic and foreign borrowing. 
 
  Formally, the government budget balance, GBAL, is given by 
 
GBAL = TAX + AID - PQ·(CG+IG) - RG*·ER·FdebtG-1 - RD·DdebtG-1,         (18)   17
 
where CG is current non-interest expenditure, IG is total public investment, FdebtG is 
the stock of foreign debt (defined below), RG* the interest rate on that debt, DdebtG 
the stock of domestic debt, RD the interest rate on that debt, and TAX total tax 
revenue. Both RG* and RD are assumed exogenous. AID is total aid measured in 
domestic-currency terms, and is given by 
 
AID = ER·(FAID$ + NFAID$),                                       (19) 
 
where FAID$ is food aid and NFAID$ nonfood aid, both measured in foreign-currency 
terms. Assuming that the foreign-currency price of food aid is normalized to unity, 
FAID$ can also be interpreted as a quantity variable. 
 
The stock of domestic debt is defined as 
 
DdebtG = DB + DdebtG-1,                                            (20) 
 




Total real public investment, IG, is defined as the sum of investment in health, 
education, and infrastructure: 
 
IG = IGedu + IGhea + IGinf,                                            (21) 
 
where each component is given as a fixed fraction of total investment: 
 
IGh = κh·IG,                                                          (22) 
                                                 
8Note also that, given the non-monetary nature of the model, there is no market per se for 
government debt, and no account of the possible perverse effect of the growth in domestic debt on the 
fiscal stance, through risk premia and effective borrowing costs (as, for instance, in Agénor, Jensen, 
Verghis, and Yeldan (2004)). Indeed, as noted in the text, the interest rate on domestic debt is also 
taken to be exogenous.   18
 
with h = edu, hea, inf, and Σκh = 1.  The coefficients 0 ≤ κh ≤ 1 are thus policy 
parameters that capture the allocation of public investment. 
 
In line with the fiscal response models discussed in the introduction, we 
assume that total tax revenue depends on domestic sales excluding food aid, Qs, 
and that the effective tax rate, TXR, depends on the ratio of total government 
expenditure, GTOT, to nominal gross domestic product, NGDP, and the level of total 
aid to NGDP, in order to capture a possible adverse effect of foreign assistance on 
fiscal effort:  
 
TAX = TXR(GTOT/NGDP, AID/NGDP)·PQ·Qs + tm·ER·PM*·M,                  (23) 
 
where total government spending is defined as 
 
GTOT = PQ·(CG + IG) + RG*·ER·FdebtG-1 + RD·DdebtG-1,                  (24) 
 
and nominal GDP (at market prices) is  
 
NGDP = PQ·Qd + PX·X - PM·M,                                         (25) 
 
With Qd defined in equation (14). 
 
Current non-interest expenditure, measured in proportion of GDP, is taken to 
be a positive function of the lagged value of the total tax-to-GDP ratio, TAX/NGDP (a 
measure of the domestic capacity to raise resources for current outlays and capital 
formation by the government), aid as a share of domestic GDP, and on its value in 
the previous period, to account for persistence effects associated with spending 
items such as salaries, transfers, and maintenance outlays:
9  
                                                 
9The link between nonfood aid and public investment captured here is consistent with the 
empirical results of Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissey (2002), who found evidence of a positive effect of 
aid on investment and growth in sub-Saharan Africa.   19
 
PQ·CG/NGDP = cg[(TAX/NGDP)-1, ER·AID$/NGDP, (PQ·CG/NGDP)-1].       (26) 
 
Total public investment, also as a share of domestic output, is taken to depend 
also positively on the lagged value of the tax-to-GDP ratio and nonfood aid as a 
share of domestic output, and negatively on the ratio of foreign debt service to 




PQ·IG/NGDP = ig[(TAX/NGDP)-1, ER·NFAID$/NGDP, (ER·NFAID$/NGDP)^2, 
RG*·ER·FdebtG-1/NGDP].   (27) 
 
Thus, debt relief (a reduction in FdebtG) can lead to higher growth and lower 
poverty by increasing public investment. Moreover, we introduce a nonlinearity in the 
relationship between nonfood aid and public investment, by adding the squared value 
of the ratio of the former variable to output in the equation.  To the extent that the 
coefficient of the linear term is positive and that of the quadratic term is negative, this 
specification would allow us to capture limits on the government’s absorptive 
capacity: nonfood foreign assistance would be positively related to public capital 
outlays only up to a certain level of aid, and would be negatively related thereafter. In 
such conditions, aid would entail diminishing returns, as suggested for instance by 
the empirical results of Lensink and White (2001). 
 
  Stocks of public capital in education, health, and infrastructure are given by  
 
KGh = IGh-1 + (1 - δh)KGh-1,         h = edu, hea, inf,                 (28) 
 
where 0 < δh < 1 is a constant depreciation rate. 
                                                 
10Clements et al. (2003) also found that the adverse effect of debt service on public investment 
is nonlinear, and that urbanization and trade openness have a positive effect on the ratio of public 
investment to GDP in low-income countries. These additional variables could easily be added to the 
model, but we refrained from doing so given that none of them proved significant in the regression 
results for Ethiopia reported below. Note also that Mahdavi (2004) found an adverse effect of the level 
of foreign debt  itself on capital expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa.   20
4.  Balance of Payments and the Exchange Rate 
 
  The balance of payments accounts for trade flows, interest payments, foreign 
borrowing, and aid. Measured in foreign-currency terms, it is given by  
 
PX*·X - PM*·M  - RG*·FdebtG-1 - RP*·FdebtP-1 + UTR$                 (29) 
 
+ (FAID$ + NFAID$) + FG + FP - DNFA = 0, 
 
where FP denotes private capital inflows and DNFA the change in net foreign assets 
of the central bank (both assumed exogenous). The foreign-currency value of the 
stock of private foreign debt, FdebtP, is thus defined as 
 
FdebtP = FP + FdebtP-1,                                            (30) 
 
whereas the foreign-currency value of the stock of external public debt, FdebtG, is 
given by 
 
FdebtG = FG + FdebtG-1,                                           (31) 
 
with FG denoting the flow of government borrowing abroad. Given our intention to 
calibrate the model later on to Ethiopia, a country that has been operating a flexible 
exchange rate regime, we assume that the balance of payments clears through 
adjustment in the nominal exchange rate, ER. 
 
5.  Market Equilibrium and Domestic Prices 
 
  The supply of goods to the domestic market (excluding food aid), Qs, is 
determined through a CES combination of imports and domestic sales of the 
domestically-produced good, DOM: 
 
Qs = ADM[βDM·DOM
-ρDM + (1 - βDM)M
-ρDM]
-1/ρDM,                        (32)   21
 
where σDM = 1/(1+ρDM) is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and 
imported goods.  
 
  The price of the composite good, PQ, is a CES aggregation of the price of the 









).                        (33) 
 
Market equilibrium requires equality between the total supply of goods on the 
domestic market (which includes not only the supply of the composite good, Qs, but 
also food aid, sold by the government at the price at which it receives it) be equal to 
total aggregate demand for these goods (which consists of demand for the composite 
good, Qd, and demand for food aid). We assume that the demand for food aid is 
perfectly elastic at the government-imposed price, which implies that the actual 
quantity of food aid transacted in the market is supply-determined. The equilibrium 
condition between aggregate supply and aggregate demand therefore boils down to 
equality between the supply and demand for the composite good:
11 
 




PQ·Q ª PD·DOM + PM·M,                                        (35) 
 
can therefore be used to determine the price of domestic goods, PD, whereas 
equation (15) can be used to determine either the quantity of domestically-produced 
goods, DOM, or imports, M. 
                                                 
11Implicit in our specification is the assumption that total supply of goods is additive, that is, 
given by PQ·Qs + ER·FAID$. Thus, food aid displaces the supply of composite goods, consisting of 
domestic and imported goods, on a one-to-one equal basis. An alternative specification would be to 
use a second-level CES function with either Qs and ER·FAID$/PQ, or M and ER·FAID$/PQ. In the 
latter case, food aid would primarily displace private imports, rather than domestic production.   22
 
6.  Deficit Financing, Private Savings and Investment 
 
Using (18) and (24), the government budget balance, GBAL, can be rewritten 
as 
 
GBAL = TAX + AID - GTOT.                                          (36) 
  
The government budget deficit, - GBAL, can be financed by either domestic 
borrowing, DB, or foreign financing, FG: 
 
- GBAL = DB + FG.                                                  (37) 
  
  This equation can be used to determined either DB or FG. If, for instance, the 
deficit is financed by (concessional) borrowing from abroad (as assumed in the 
application to Ethiopia that we discuss later on), and DB is predetermined, then  
 
                                                 FG = - GBAL - DB.                                                       
  
From the household budget constraint, private savings, SP, is given by  
 
SP = Ydisp - PQ·CP.                                                (38) 
 
Private investment (as a share of GDP) is assumed to depend on the rate of 
growth in net domestic output (to capture either an accelerator effect or the 
assumption that the rate of return on physical capital is positively correlated with the 
rate of growth), private foreign capital flows (measured as a proportion of GDP), 
ER·FP/NGDP, the economy’s total foreign debt over GDP, ER·FdebtTot/NGDP, to 
capture a possible debt overhang effect (an important consideration for low-income 
countries), and the stock of public capital in infrastructure, relative to the size of the   23
population, KGinf/
θI, to capture the complementarity effect (as well as congestion 
effects) alluded to above:
12 
 
PQ·IP/NGDP = IP[∆Ys/Ys-1, KGinf/Ys-1
θI, ER·FP/NGDP, ER·FdebtTot/NGDP],   (39) 
 
where total external debt, FdebtTot, is defined as 
 
FdebtTot = FdebtP + FdebtG.                                        (40) 
 
Using equations (11) to (14), (24), (25), (29), (35), (37) and (39), it can be 
shown that the model imposes equality between private investment and private 
savings. The resulting equation, however, is not independent from the rest of the 
system. It can therefore be either eliminated or used for consistency checks. 
 
7.  Poverty Analysis 
 
  
To link changes in consumption and poverty, and assess the effects of policy 
shocks on the poor, an attractive methodology from an operational standpoint is the 
procedure proposed by Agénor, Izquierdo and Fofack (2003), and further developed 
by Agénor, Chen, and Grimm (2004), in the context of the Integrated Macroeconomic 
Model for Poverty Analysis (IMMPA). Assuming that the focus is on consumption as a 
measure of poverty, applying this procedure would entail following five steps in the 
present case: 
 
1.  From an existing household survey, extract the value of consumption (in 
current monetary units) for each household, and given the poverty line, calculate the 
initial poverty rate, using various standard indicators (such as the headcount index, 
the poverty gap, and so on). 
                                                 
12Pattillo, Poirson, and Ricci (2002, 2004) found a negative relationship between external debt 
and private capital formation in developing countries. See Agénor (2004a, Chapter 2) for a detailed 
review of the evidence. In line for instance with the results of Hermes and Lensink (2001), the effect of 
public capital in infrastructure on private investment could be modeled in a nonlinear fashion. The   24
 
2.  Following a policy or exogenous shock, generate the growth rate in per 
capita consumption of the representative household in the macro model, up to the 
end of the simulation horizon (say, period t+N). 
 
3. Apply this growth rate to the consumption expenditure data for each 
household in the survey. This gives new consumption levels for each household, for 
periods t+1,...t+N. 
 
4. Update the poverty line in the survey for periods t+1,...t+N by using the 
growth rate of the composite price index generated by the macro model. This 
assumes implicitly that the poverty line is constant in real terms. 
 
5.  Using the new data on nominal consumption per household and the 
poverty line, calculate “post-shock” poverty indicators. Compare with initial indicators 
to assess the poverty effect of the shock. 
 
In this approach, and given the assumption of only one representative 
household in the model, changes in inequality cannot be accounted for 
endogenously. Moreover, distribution among the households contained in the survey 
is assumed not to change following any shock. Growth (in consumption) is thus 
implicitly assumed to be distribution neutral. 
 
Ignoring the inequality component of changes in poverty can be justified if the 
available data on changes in inequality are not deemed reliable (which is not quite 
the same as saying that they don’t matter), if somehow past evidence suggests that 
income distribution does not change much following certain types of policy shocks, or 
if the emphasis is on growth as being both necessary and sufficient to reduce poverty 
in low-income countries (see Agénor (2004d)). The caveat, of course, is that to the 
                                                                                                                                                         
impact of foreign debt on private investment could also be assumed to be nonlinear, to reflect greater 
perceptions of confiscation risk beyond a certain level of debt.    25
extent that distribution changes, growth may not trickle down automatically to the 
poor (see Heltberg (2002), and Dagdeviren, van der Hoeven, and Weeks (2002)). 
 
An alternative approach is to relate directly the poverty rate, estimated for 
some base period, to the rate of change of the growth rate of consumption per capita 
derived from the model, using an estimated partial elasticity. This approach is 
attractive for countries where a representative and reliable household survey is not 
available (as is the case in several low-income countries), and only a point estimate 
of poverty can be relied on. Another advantage of this procedure is that changes in 
income distribution can be captured indirectly; by varying the partial growth elasticity 
within a “plausible” range around (minus) unity, non-neutral changes in growth rates 
can be accounted for. Although somewhat ad hoc, we also use this approach in the 
simulation results reported below. 
 
  A complete list of the model’s equations is provided in Appendix A, whereas a 
list of endogenous and exogenous variables, as well as parameter values, is 
provided in Appendices B and C. The structure of the model is summarized in Figure 
1, under the assumption that the government fiscal deficit is financed by domestic 
and foreign borrowing. 
 
 
III. AN APPLICATION TO ETHIOPIA 
 
  To illustrate the functioning of the model developed in the previous section, we 
apply it to Ethiopia, a country with one of the lowest income per capita in the world. 
We begin with a brief review of trends in growth and poverty, foreign aid and its 
composition, and public investment in Ethiopia. Next, we report econometric 
estimates of some of the behavioral equations of the model and describe some 
features of the calibration procedure (such as the estimation of the capital stock 
variables), as well as the household survey that we use. We then discuss the 
assumptions underlying trend-based projections for the period 2003-15, as a prelude 
to the policy experiments that we conduct in the next section.   26
1.  Background 
 
  With a GDP per capita of around $100, Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries 
in the world. Life expectancy, literacy rates, and other indicators of human 
development are all extremely low. Spells of drought, with resulting famines, have a 
strong impact on the whole economy and have led over the past three decades to a 
high degree of output and income volatility (see Figure 2). Changes in rainfall have a 
substantial impact on consumption growth, which appears to persist for several years 
(Dercon (2004)). Domestic savings, at slightly above 2 percent of GDP in 2002, are 
too low to meet the country’s investment needs. As a result, foreign borrowing and 
foreign aid increased significantly during the 1990s. 
 
After a long period of continuous deterioration due to detrimental economic 
policies pursued during the communist regime (1974-91), the downward trend in real 
income per capita was reversed in the 1990s. Real GDP grew at an average of 3.6 
percent per year over the 1992-2002 period. This led to an increase of 1.5 percent in 
income per capita. By the end of the 1990s, the level of income was back to the all 
time high achieved in the early 1970s. As a result, poverty declined during the 1990s. 
However, the magnitude of this decline remains a matter of debate. Official sources, 
based on household surveys, indicate that the poverty headcount index was 44.2 
percent in 1999/00 for the country as a whole, down from 45.5 percent in 1995/96, 
whereas inequality changed relatively little, with a Gini coefficient of 0.29 for 1995/96 
and 0.28 for 1999/00 (see Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2002)).  By 
contrast, Bigsten et al. (2003), in a study focusing on the period 1994-97 but with 
surveys of smaller size, found very different results. They decomposed changes in 
poverty into growth and redistribution components. They found that poverty declined 
from 41 percent to 36 percent for the country as a whole. But the increase in real per 
capita income was to some extent counteracted by a worsening of income 
distribution, with an increase in the Gini coefficient from 39.2 percent in 1994 to 43.5 
percent in 1997. Despite these differences, it is clear that poverty remains high. 
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Foreign aid, as measured by the levels of total net Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) received by the country, has increased on average in recent years 
but remains modest. Figure 2 displays the evolution of aid per capita since the mid-
1970s. The data show that ODA per capita reached a peak at the end of the 1980s-
early 1990s, in part as a result of the dramatic famine of 1984, and then declined 
steadily to a low of about $9.7 per capita in 1997. Since then, and following the end 
of the war with Eritrea, this trend has been progressively reversed. ODA per capita 
reached $17 per capita in 2001 and preliminary data indicate that it has remained 
robust since then, with net ODA per capita at $19.4 in 2002. Overall, during the 
period 1992-2002, Ethiopia received about $913 million of ODA per year on average 
(of which around 71 percent in the form of grants and the rest at highly concessional 
terms) equivalent to $15.4 per capita and 14 percent of GDP. Grant flows were 
equivalent to 10 percent of the country’s GDP and $11 per capita. However, while 
Ethiopia receives important amounts of ODA in absolute terms, it is below sub-
Saharan averages in per capita terms, compared in particular to countries like 
Mozambique, Malawi, and Niger. 
 
Regarding the composition of aid, the share of food aid in total ODA grants 
fluctuated significantly during the past decades (see Figure 3). During the period 
1992-2002, it amounted to about 15 percent of total grants. As a result, nonfood aid 
(that is, total ODA grants excluding food aid), was about $9.4 per capita per year over 
the same period (for total grants of $11 per capita). More recently, between 1999 and 
2002, the proportion of food aid  increased rapidly to reach more than one-third of 
total ODA grants: nonfood aid and food aid were respectively equivalent to $5.8 and 
$3 per capita. Meanwhile, ODA loans were equivalent to $5.5 per capita (for an 
amount of total ODA, including loans, of $14.3 per capita). Figure 4 displays the 
evolution of foreign aid in proportion of tax revenue and government final 
consumption expenditure during the period 1975-2002. The data show that, despite 
significant fluctuations during the period, and steady declines in both ratios during the 
early 1990s, foreign aid continues to play a significant role in government spending 
and revenues. Since 1998, foreign aid has accounted for about 60 percent of tax 
revenues, and for about 50 percent of government consumption. A key issue, as   28
noted earlier, is whether the reliance on aid has led to a decrease in tax effort. At the 
same time, however, we observe a fairly close relationship, except for the early 
1990s, between nonfood aid and public investment (see Figure 5). As discussed 
later, this correlation is corroborated by more formal econometric tests. 
 
During the 1990s, public investment increased significantly in proportion of 
GDP (see Figure 6), much of it going to infrastructure (transportation, energy, and 
telecommunications) and education (Figure 7). On average, during 1991-2002, public 
investment accounted for more than half (around 54 percent) of total fixed capital 
formation. The road network, for instance, expanded from 19,000 km in 1991 to 
around 34,000 km in 2003, whereas power generation doubled over the same period. 
Primary school enrollment rose from 20 percent in 1993 to 62 percent in 2002. 
According to our index of quality of public infrastructure, which is based on the 
methodology proposed by Hulten (1996), quality, which appears to have been quite 
low during the 1970s and 1980s, improved significantly during the late 1990s (see 
Figure 8).
13 Road infrastructure appears to generate substantial externalities (see 
Dercon (2004)). Yet, connectivity remains underdeveloped: all infrastructure networks 
(telecommunications, roads, energy, and water) have coverage well below averages 
for sub-Saharan Africa. Also, the needs for education and health services remain 
enormous.  
 
This brief review suggests that, despite significant improvements in living 
standards during the second half of the 1990s, reducing poverty remains a challenge. 
Ethiopia continues to be a very destitute country adversely affected by acute 
diseases (malaria and the HIV/AIDS epidemic) and periodic famines. The evolution of 
life expectancy, a good indicator of whether a country is meeting its basic needs, and 
which is strongly correlated with per capita growth, illustrates this point quite well. 
                                                 
13Hulten (1996) drew attention to the importance of taking into account the efficiency with 
which the public capital stock is used, in addition to the absolute amount of that stock. He proposed a 
measure of public capital efficiency based on four indicators: a) mainline faults per 100 telephone calls 
for telecommunications; b) electricity generation losses as a percent of total electricity output; c) the 
percentage of paved roads in good condition; and d) diesel locomotive utilization as a percentage of 
the total rolling stock. Due to data limitations, however, we used only b) and c) in calculating our   29
Levels of human and infrastructure capital (including not only roads, irrigation, 
electricity, but also storage and marketing facilities) remain low.  Given the low levels 
of domestic savings, a key issue to address is the role that foreign aid, and aid-
funded increases in public investment, can play to accelerate growth and foster 
private investment, through “crowding in” effects. More specifically, can greater 
priority to public investment in basic infrastructure foster growth and accelerate 
poverty reduction, as well as improve access to education and health services?   
Increases in public investment seem indeed to have been closely correlated with 
private investment (see Figure 6), and this correlation (at least for investment in 
infrastructure) appears to be supported by formal econometric regressions, as 
reported below. Related issues are the need to consider possible trade-offs that may 
arise regarding the allocation of public investment between education, health, and 
infrastructure, and account for the adverse incentive effect on tax collection and 
Dutch disease effects associated with increases in foreign assistance. These are 
precisely the type of questions that our model is designed to address. 
 
2.  Parameter Estimates and Calibration 
 
To apply the model to Ethiopia, we first estimated some of the behavioral 
equations described earlier. Specifically, using annual time series, we estimated a 
consumption function and the three “fiscal” regressions—those linking the effective 
tax rate to the aid-GDP ratio and the government spending-GDP ratio; government 
consumption expenditure to the tax revenue-GDP ratio and aid-GDP ratio; and public 
investment to the tax revenue-GDP ratio, the nonfood aid-GDP ratio, and the foreign 
debt service-GDP ratio (equations (A12), (A21), (A24), and (A25) in Appendix A). The 
regression results (available upon request) gave a short-term elasticity of private 
consumption to disposable income of 0.47. The regression with the effective tax rate 
as the dependent variable indicated that the aid-GDP ratio did not have a highly 
significant adverse effect on tax effort; however, the coefficient, -0.12, had the right 
(negative) sign, and we kept it in the specification. We did the same with the 
                                                                                                                                                         
quality index. These indicators were normalized, by taking deviations from means and dividing by 
standard errors. We then took a simple average of the two indicators to obtain an aggregate index.   30
government spending-GDP ratio, which had a coefficient of 0.1. By contrast, the 
coefficient of the lagged value of the effective tax ratio, was found to be highly 
significant and relatively large, at 0.75. The results also indicated that the tax 
revenue-GDP ratio and the ratio of nonfood aid to GDP had a positive effect on the 
public investment-GDP ratio, with coefficients less than unity. We initially tested for a 
nonlinear effect of nonfood aid, in line with the specification in equation (A25). 
However, the coefficient associated with the squared term was found to be 
insignificant.  We also found no evidence of an adverse effect of debt service on 
public capital formation. Both variables were therefore dropped from the final results. 
Of course, the fact that the quadratic term in nonfood aid was not significant does not 
imply that absorption constraints do not exist, or do not matter, but rather that in the 




We also estimated a private investment equation, starting from the 
specification given above (see also equation (A37)). Preliminary regressions 
indicated that private foreign capital flows as a share of GDP were not significant. We 
tested for the effect of the current and lagged values of the external debt-GDP ratio, 
using both linear and quadratic terms (to capture a possible nonlinear relationship, as 
indicated earlier), but both variables turned out to be either insignificant or to have an 
incorrect sign. They were therefore dropped from the final specification. The two 
variables left in the regression are the rate of growth of real output (with a coefficient 
of 0.097 and a Student-t of 2.18), and the ratio of the public capital stock in 
infrastructure to GDP, with a coefficient of 0.086 and a Student-t of 6.55.  Although in 
both cases the coefficients are relatively small, the data do provide supportive 
evidence of both an accelerator effect (with the growth rate acting possibly as an 
indicator of the rate of return on physical capital as well) and a complementarity effect 
of public capital in infrastructure on private capital formation, as discussed earlier. 
 
                                                 
14In the experiments reported below, we found that the parameters relating the government 
consumption expenditure-GDP ratio and the public investment-GDP ratio to the tax revenue-GDP ratio 
created instability. Given the short time series available, we chose to reduce the values of these 
parameters, within two standard errors of the point estimates.   31
All other parameters were determined either by using shares for the base 
period, by dwelling on the literature on Ethiopia, or (when country-specific data were 
not available) by using plausible values for low-income developing countries in 
general. The elasticities of substitution on the production side were kept at relatively 
low values (see Appendix C). For instance, the elasticity of substitution between T 
and KP, σJ, was set to 0.3; the elasticity of substitution between LE and 
Kghea/POP
θH, σT, was set to 0.3; and the elasticity of substitution between J and 
KGinf, σY, was set to 0.5. Measures of congestion effects were difficult to estimate, 
given the lack of information for developing countries in general. We used relatively 
low values to avoid putting undue weight on these parameters. Specifically, for the 
parameter capturing congestion effects in the education system, θE, we chose a 
value of 0.3; for the parameter determining the strength of congestion effects in the 
provision of health services, θH, we chose a value of 0.1; and for the parameter 
capturing congestion effects in infrastructure capital, θI, we chose a value of 0.2.  
Relatively small values (in the range of 2 to 4 percent) were also chosen for the 
depreciation rates of the various capital stocks, in line with available estimates. The 
long-run elasticity of transformation in domestic production was set at 0.3, whereas 
the long-run elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods was set 
at 0.4. We also assumed that the allocation of private expenditure between these 
goods (equation (A14)) occurs gradually, with an adjustment parameter that captures 
a low propensity to substitute between domestic and imported goods in the short run. 
Similarly, the allocation of domestic output between domestic sales and exports 
(equation (A4)) was also assumed to be subject to a partial adjustment process. 
 
We calibrated the model for 2002, the most recent year for which we were 
able to construct a complete set of macro accounts. Data on national accounts, fiscal 
accounts, balance of payments (based on IMF estimates), and OECD data were 
combined to produce a consistent set of estimates (see Appendix C). Significant 
discrepancies appeared in the aid data between national sources, the OECD’s DAC 
database, and the fiscal and balance-of-payments accounts; we chose to use the 
OECD data, which are the most comprehensive, and adjusted the other information 
accordingly while keeping intact major equilibrium relationships (namely, the fiscal   32
balance and the current account of the balance of payments). Capital stock data 
(both public and private) were derived using the perpetual inventory method, using 
relatively small depreciation rates, as indicated earlier. In solving the model, we use 
the net output price as the numéraire, and therefore keep its value fixed in all the 
experiments that are reported below. 
 
To calculate the poverty effects of policy shocks, we first linked the model to a 
household survey, using the methodology outlined earlier. The data that we use are 
from the 1999/2000 Household Income, Consumption, and Expenditure Survey 
(HICES) conducted by the Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority. The survey covers 
17,332 households, of which 8,660 are from rural areas and 8,672 from urban areas. 
Given an initial poverty line (at current prices), we calculated the headcount index for 
the survey year. For 2003 onward, based on the projections of the model, each 
observation in the sample is adjusted using the rate of growth of nominal 
consumption per capita, whereas the poverty line is adjusted using the growth rate of 
composite prices. Given these projections, a new poverty rate is calculated for each 
period. We used the same procedure (using actual data on consumer prices and 
consumption per capita) to update our estimates of the poverty rate for 2001 and 
2002.  
 
We also used the partial growth elasticity approach mentioned earlier to relate 
the “base” poverty rate and the rate of growth of real consumption per capita. Three 
different values for that elasticity are specified: -1.0 (which corresponds to the case 
where growth is distribution neutral), -0.5, and -1.8. The elasticity of -0.5 is close to 
the elasticity of the poverty headcount index with respect to the change in (mean) 
expenditure estimated by Christiansen, Demery, and Paternostro (2003, Table 4, p. 
326) for Ethiopia. The elasticity of -1.8 (which is within the two-standard error interval 
of the point estimate provided by Ravallion (2001)) reflects the case where 
consumption growth is “pro-poor”, in the sense that it entails a more than proportional 
effect of increases in consumption on poverty—or, equivalently, the case where 
consumption growth is accompanied by lower income inequality. 
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3.  Trend-based Projections 
 
Before conducting policy experiments with the model, we first project how the 
Ethiopian economy would evolve if recent economic trends were to continue into the 
future. Given that the model uses 2002 as its base period, this requires in turn 
making a series of assumptions for the policy and other exogenous variables, over 
the period 2003-2015. The assumptions underlying these projections remain, of 
course, somewhat arbitrary, but they are instructive to the extent that they serve to 
highlight the need for changes in the policy environment to stimulate growth and 
reduce poverty in the long term. 
 
The stock of land is assumed constant and normalized to unity. The quality of 
public infrastructure is assumed to remain constant throughout. Population and the 
supply of raw labor are both assumed to grow at the constant rate of 2.9 percent. The 
shares of public investment in infrastructure, health and education are kept constant 
at their base period values (about 46 percent, for instance, for infrastructure). 
Domestic borrowing (which is negative in the base year) is assumed to increase to 2 
percent of GDP in 2003 and to remain constant after that in proportion of GDP. Given 
the overall fiscal balance, we assume that Ethiopia borrows externally at 
concessional terms to close its budget gap. The interest rate on foreign public debt is 
assumed to be constant at 0.075 percent, whereas interest rates on private foreign 
borrowing and on domestic public debt are taken to be fixed at the level observed in 
2002. Foreign aid (measured in domestic-currency terms) is kept constant in 
proportion of GDP at the 2002 level (about 11.6 percent). The allocation of foreign 
assistance between food and nonfood aid is done according to the constant shares 
observed in the base period (with food aid representing 37.5 percent of total aid). 
Public foreign borrowing is determined residually to balance the government budget 
(given the assumption of a constant domestic borrowing-GDP ratio), whereas private 
capital inflows are constant in per capita terms. Private unrequited transfers 
(measured in foreign-currency terms) are also assumed to grow in line with the 
population. The change in official reserves is assumed to be constant in proportion of 
total capital inflows (private and public). Prices of imports and exports are assumed   34
to grow at a constant annual rate, which is set equal in the first case to the average 
rate of growth over the period 1995-2002, and in the second to 2 percent per annum. 
Finally, the effective tax rate, although endogenous, is assumed to increase 
permanently by 0.5 percentage points in 2003. This increase is meant to capture a 
slight improvement in tax collection, rather than an increase in statutory tax rates.  
 
 The  trend-based  projections are shown in Table 1 for the period 2003-15. The 
results show relatively high growth rates in net domestic output in the initial years, but 
declining growth rates in real GDP per capita and real consumption per capita. Part 
of the reason is that domestic prices grow at relatively high rates during most of the 
period, and population grows at a rate of almost 3 percent per annum. Private 
savings (as a share of GDP) increase significantly during the period, but private 
investment rises only slightly (from 9.7 percent in 2002 to 11.6 percent in 2015). This 
is the consequence, in part, of the relatively small increase in the share of public 
investment in GDP (by about 2.4 percentage points between 2002 and 2015). Public 
consumption rises also during the period (from about 29 percent to 35 percent) and, 
despite the increase in domestic tax revenue, the overall fiscal deficit remains high 
throughout the period. As a result, public foreign borrowing remains also high, 
leading to a sharp increase over time in the ratio of external debt to GDP, and the 
ratio of external debt service to exports. The real exchange rate (defined as the ratio 
of import prices measured in domestic-currency terms to the composite price index) 
appreciates at first and then depreciates; this tends to reduce exports initially and to 
increase them subsequently. The share of educated labor in the population falls 
steadily over time, as a result of both insufficient public investment and high 
population growth. 
 
The projections reveal also that, given the above assumptions about Ethiopia’s 
policies and international environment, prospects for reducing poverty by 2015 are 
mixed. The table shows the evolution of the headcount index obtained by linking the 
model to a household survey, using the methodology described earlier. In addition, 
the table shows the response of the poverty rate to a change in the growth rate of 
consumption per capita, using three alternative partial elasticities, as discussed   35
earlier: -0.5, -1.0, and -1.8.
15 With the survey data, poverty falls from 39 percent in 
2002 to 35 percent in 2015. With the elasticity approach, in the most favorable case 
(an elasticity of -1.8), poverty falls from 42.3 percent in 2002 to 26.1 percent in 2015. 
However, with a partial elasticity of -0.5 (which is close to the estimate provided by 
Christiansen, Demery, and Paternostro (2003) for Ethiopia, as noted earlier), the 
poverty rate falls from 43.7 percent to only 38.4 percent. Thus, whether a significant 
and sustained reduction in poverty can be achieved in Ethiopia may depend crucially 
on the country’s ability to improve its growth performance.  We now turn to an 




IV. POLICY EXPERIMENTS 
 
  We now examine four types of policy experiments: changes in the level and 
composition of foreign aid (which imply also changes in the level of public 
investment), changes in the composition of public spending coupled with a 
reallocation of public investment (for a given level of foreign aid), and an evaluation 
of the level of aid needed by Ethiopia to achieve a 50 percent reduction in poverty 
between 2003 and 2015. All results are displayed as percentage changes (for 
variables in levels) or absolute differences (for variables in percentage form) from 
baseline values. 
 
1.  Change in the Level of Foreign Aid 
 
Our first experiment consists of a permanent increase in the aid-GDP ratio by 
one percentage point relative to the baseline scenario. This implies that both 
categories of aid increase in the same proportion, given that the shares of food and 
nonfood aid remain constant. 
 
                                                 
15Note that these calculations do not account for the possibility of asymmetric effects in the 
relationship between growth and poverty—an issue discussed at length in Agénor (2004c). These 
effects could actually make the prospect for poverty reduction worse than it appears.   36
The results of this experiment are shown in Table 2. The direct effect of the 
increase in aid is on the budget. On the one hand it lowers the fiscal deficit (because 
it adds to resources “above the line”), and on the other it increases it, because it 
raises overall public investment, as discussed in the previous section. The increase 
in public investment is initially of the order of 0.7 percent of GDP, but it rises over 
time (as a result of the increase in tax revenue), becoming almost one to one. The 
initial reduction in the budget deficit therefore gradually disappears. The increase in 
public investment in infrastructure “crowds in” private investment and leads to a 
higher growth rate in output of about 0.2 percentage points in the long run. The 
increase in private capital accumulation tends to raise the demand for educated 
labor, given the low degree of substitution between these factors. Because the 
increase in public investment is allocated across all components of government 
capital formation (according to initial shares), the greater demand for educated labor 
is matched at least in part by an increase in supply. Over time, the increase in the 
stock of public capital in health raises the efficiency of educated labor, whereas the 
increase in public capital in infrastructure raises the marginal productivity of all other 
production factors (including “effective” labor). These productivity gains contribute 
also to higher domestic output, which in turn raises consumption spending and 
lowers poverty. The growth rate of real disposable income per capita rises at its peak 
by almost 0.6 percentage points; the poverty rate, based on survey data, falls by 3.6 
percentage points by 2015, whereas the estimate based on a partial elasticity of -1.8 
falls by about 4.3 percentage points by 2015.  The order of magnitude is thus similar 
in both cases.  However, with a partial elasticity of -0.5, poverty falls by only 1.1 
percentage points at the same horizon. 
 
Throughout the adjustment period, the real exchange rate depreciates as a 
result of both an initial reduction in composite prices and a nominal depreciation. 
Downward pressure on the price of domestic goods is the result of a supply response 
that dominates the increase in aggregate demand resulting from higher government 
spending. Consequently, production is reallocated toward exports, which increase by 
about 0.7 percentage points in the long run. At the initial levels of imports and foreign 
borrowing, the expansion of exports and the aid inflow tend to appreciate the   37
exchange rate; but the resulting drop in the relative price of imported goods and the 
reduction in foreign borrowing implied by the inflow of aid (given our budget closure 
rule) are such that the general equilibrium effect is an increase in imports and a 
nominal depreciation. And because the increase in imports exceeds the expansion of 
exports, the net result is a deterioration in the trade balance.  
 
Thus, an important feature of this simulation is that Dutch disease effects do 
not materialize—not even in the short run. Because the increase in nonfood aid 
raises public investment, and thus private capital formation, the adverse effect of a 
rise in aggregate demand on prices is offset by the positive supply-side effects of the 
increase in public and private capital. At the same time, the inflow of aid leads to a 
reduction in government foreign borrowing, which dampens the initial upward effect 
of the increase in foreign exchange supply on the nominal exchange rate. In effect, 
there is substitution between debt and non-debt creating capital inflows. The net 
effect is a reduction in domestic prices, a real depreciation, and a rise in exports. The 
broader implications of this experiment are that when assessing the magnitude of 
Dutch disease effects, it is crucial to distinguish between (short-run) demand-side 
effects and (longer-run) supply-side effects, and to take into account the nature of the 
budget closure rule. 
 
2.  Change in the Composition of Foreign Aid  
 
  Our second experiment involves a change in the initial allocation of foreign aid 
between food and nonfood assistance. Specifically, we assume that the share of food 
(respectively nonfood) aid in total aid is changed permanently by 2 percentage points 
from 37.5 (respectively 62.5) percent initially to 35.5 (respectively 64.5) percent.  
 
The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 3. The increase in 
nonfood aid leads to higher public investment (by about 0.5 percent of GDP in the 
long run), which stimulates growth per capita (between 0.1 and 0.2 percentage 
points). As a result of both the expansion in output and the increase in public capital 
in infrastructure, private investment rises over time, albeit by a small amount. Real   38
disposable income increases also in the long run and poverty falls. Given the 
magnitude of the shock, it has relatively limited aggregate effects. Nevertheless, 
these results indicate that a large reallocation of aid could have potentially large 
effects on poverty. This is discussed in more detail below. 
 
3.  Change in the Composition of Public Spending and Investment 
 
Our third experiment involves a change in the composition of government 
spending, consisting of a 7 percent reduction in consumption expenditure, coupled 
with an offsetting increase in public investment, and accompanied by a reallocation of 
outlays involving an increase in investment in infrastructure that is twice as high as 
the increase in health and education.
16 Thus, the share of investment in health is 
taken to increase by 3.5 percentage points (from 4.3 percent initially to 7.8 percent of 
total public investment), the share of education by 2.8 percentage points (from 8.6 
percent initially to 11.4 percent), and the share of infrastructure by 0.7 percentage 
points (from 45.8 percent initially to 46.5 percent). This experiment helps to illustrate 
a strategy that attaches more importance to public infrastructure as the “engine” of 
growth, both because of its effect on the productivity of private inputs and its 
complementarity effect on private investment.  
 
The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 4. To the extent that 
changes in public consumption and investment tend to offset each other in the initial 
period, the net effect on output growth is negligible. However, in the intermediate run, 
because supply-side effects develop only gradually, the reduction in aggregate 
demand tends to dominate and to exert a downward effect on output. Real GDP per 
capita falls between the second and sixth periods. Over time, as the supply-side 
benefits associated with higher public investment start kicking in, output begins to 
grow, increasing in the long run by about 0.2 percentage points. The rate of growth of 
real private disposable income follows a similar pattern over time and increases by 
                                                 
16We implicitly assume that the cut in consumption spending occurs on non-maintenance 
related items. Changes in maintenance expenditure would normally affect the quality of public capital 
(as noted earlier) and failure to account for that effect may lead to overestimating the impact of a 
reallocation of spending from consumption to investment.   39
0.18 percent in the long run. Thus, the effect on poverty is fairly small, regardless of 
the measure used. Nevertheless, both health and education indicators improve—the 
increase in the stock of public capital in health and the share of educated labor in 
total population combine to lead to an improvement in the “effective” quantity of labor. 
This effect, however, remains relatively small, and its impact on the overall growth 
rate is limited. In the long run, the reduction in government consumption outlays is 
larger than the increase in public investment; as a result, the overall fiscal balance 
improves, thereby reducing foreign borrowing needs. Both the external debt-GDP 
and the debt service-exports ratios fall over time. 
 
This experiment helps also to illustrate the need to be cautious in drawing too 
sharp a distinction between investment in “services” (that is, health and education)  
and investment in  “growth” (that is, infrastructure). In the present framework, all three 
types of public investment have a direct effect on the supply side and therefore affect 
the rate of growth. At the same time, of course, all three categories of investment 
affect production in a different manner—with health and education affecting the 
“effective” supply of labor, and infrastructure affecting the marginal productivity of all 
inputs used in private production. The relative magnitude of these effects depends, 
among other things, on the nature of the production process, the education 
technology, and the efficiency with which health services are provided. In the present 
framework, it is also possible to evaluate existing formulas aimed at determining an 
“optimal” allocation of public investment between health, education, and 
infrastructure, so as to maximize the effect of public capital formation on growth (see 
Agénor (2004b)). This “macro” perspective is thus an important complement to the 
standard “micro” approach to public investment allocation, which tends to rely 
essentially on internal rates of return. 
 
4.  Aid and Poverty Reduction Targets 
 
Our last experiment involves calculating the level of nonfood aid necessary to 
induce a sharp reduction in poverty in Ethiopia between 2002 and 2015. This is a key 
policy issue not only for Ethiopia but also for other low-income countries where the   40
current policy debate focuses on calculating how much financial support is needed to 
achieve internationally-agreed development goals for reducing poverty and improving 
key social indicators, namely, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by 
the United Nations Assembly in 1999.  
 
The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 5. They indicate that, 
through the channels highlighted in the previous experiments, a permanent increase 
of 5 percentage points of the aid-GDP ratio could lead to a reduction in the proportion 
of poor by about 20 percentage points between 2002 and 2015, if either the 
household survey linkage is used or the partial growth elasticity is -1.8. One of the 
main mechanisms, of course, is through an increase in public investment, which rises 
by about 4.9 percentage points (in terms of GDP) in the long run. The growth rates of 
real GDP per capita and disposable income follow an inverted U-shape pattern. 
Despite the sharp increase in aid, there is no evidence of a “Dutch disease” effect; in 
fact, the real exchange rate depreciates (because the increase in domestic supply 
puts downward pressure on domestic prices), leading to higher exports (which 
increase by about 4.4 percentage points of GDP in the long run). Higher income and 
tax revenue lead to a lower budget deficit (despite the increase in spending), and a 
large drop in the external debt-GDP and debt service-exports ratio in the long run.  
With a partial elasticity of -0.5, however, poverty drops by only 6 percentage points 
during the simulation period. If the actual elasticity is indeed close to -0.5 (and there 
are indications that this may well be the case), these results suggest that to reduce 
poverty by 20 percentage points between 2002 and 2015 the increase in aid should 
amount to almost 17 percentage points of GDP. This estimate is, of course, only a 
rough order of magnitude, given that it does not account for nonlinearities. But it does 
show how dramatically different the results can be, depending on the assumed 
elasticity between poverty and changes in consumption per capita. 
 
  In the above experiment, the increase in foreign aid was assumed to be 
allocated between food aid and nonfood aid according to initial shares. Table 6 
shows the results of a permanent, 5 percentage point increase in total foreign 
assistance as a share of GDP that takes the form of an increase in nonfood aid only;   41
as a result, the share of nonfood aid in total aid rises by about 11.3 percentage points 
(from 62.5 percent initially to 73.8 percent). The results are, of course, very intuitive: 
because the effect on public investment is larger (with an increase of about 7.9 
percentage points of GDP in the long run), the effects on the growth rates of output 
and disposable income per capita, as well as on private investment, are magnified. 
As a result, poverty drops by a much larger amount than before—between 28 and 29 
percentage points according to the survey data and with a partial elasticity of -1.8, 
and by 9 percentage points with an elasticity of -0.5. 
 
  Finally, instead of a permanent shock, one could ask if a “big push”, taking the 
form of a sizable, but temporary, increase in (nonfood) foreign aid, would not lead to 
similar outcomes. The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 7. They 
correspond to a temporary, 10 percentage point increase in the aid-GDP ratio over 5 
years (from 2003 to 2008), allocated entirely to nonfood aid, which therefore 
increases by 17.3 percentage points in proportion of total aid. The results are, again, 
very intuitive: given the significant supply-side effects that the public capital stock 
exerts, a temporary but large increase in the flow of aid-financed public investment 
has a sizable effect on output and income growth. These effects persist for several 
years after the shock is reversed, because the supply-side effects of public 
investment are driven by stocks (which depreciate only slowly over time), not by 
flows. Although the growth rates of both real GDP and disposable income per capita 
turn negative after 2011, the reduction in the poverty rate, by 2015, is significant and 
similar in size to the results shown in Table 6.  
 
Of course, an increase in aid of the magnitude displayed in Tables 5, 6 and 7 
may be a source of concern for the recipient country, because it may create severe 
absorption problems. Our econometric results found no evidence that the relationship 
between aid and public investment has an inverted-U shape; but this cannot be 
construed as definitive evidence against the existence of absorption constraints in 
Ethiopia, as noted earlier. Such constraints can arise from limited administrative 
capacity, weaknesses in public expenditure and financial management, or   42
governance deficiencies. In such conditions, strengthening institutions is an essential 







The purpose of this paper was to develop a macroeconomic model that 
captures the links between foreign aid, the level and composition of public 
investment, growth, and poverty reduction in low-income countries, and illustrate its 
functioning with a concrete application. The model, which was presented in the first 
part of the paper, has several important characteristics. First, it is fundamentally an 
aggregate macro framework, with one household and one (composite) domestic 
good, with the latter being imperfectly substitutable to the foreign good. The real 
exchange rate is thus endogenous.  Second, it accounts for the impact of foreign aid 
on the economy, not only through direct effects on the budget and the balance of 
payments, but also through indirect channels such as tax effort, public investment, 
government consumption, and the real exchange rate (a necessary feature to 
account for potential Dutch disease effects). In so doing it makes a key distinction 
between food aid and nonfood aid; food aid increases the domestic supply of goods, 
whereas nonfood aid is linked to public investment (and thus aggregate demand and 
the supply side). Moreover, the model accounts indirectly for the potential “moral 
hazard” effect of increased aid, that is, the possibility that it may reduce (or eliminate) 
the incentive for the recipient government to undertake necessary tax and 
expenditure reforms. 
 
Third, the model distinguishes between “raw” labor and educated labor, and 
accounts endogenously for the process through which education (a public good) is 
provided. The basic assumption is that labor needs to receive some education to be 
used productively. Fourth, the model accounts for the composition of public 
investment and public capital, in health, infrastructure, and education, with all   43
components subject to congestion costs (population for health capital, output itself for 
infrastructure, and the stock of raw labor for education). This disaggregation is 
consistent with the evidence suggesting that inadequate public capital is among the 
main variables that account for the lack of per capita growth experienced by many 
low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Fifth, constraints on absorptive capacity 
are accounted for by introducing a nonlinearity in the relationship between nonfood 
aid and total public investment, with foreign assistance being positively related to 
public capital outlays up to a certain level of aid, and negatively related thereafter. 
Thus, depending on parameter estimates, aid may entail significant diminishing 
returns. Although it does not explicitly account for all the factors (institutional or 
otherwise) that may constrain the ability of a country to absorb greater aid flows, this 
specification is tractable and quite intuitive.
17  
 
Sixth, poverty effects are calculated in two ways: first, by linking the model to a 
household survey, and second, by using partial growth elasticities. The link with a 
household survey follows the approach first proposed by Agénor, Izquierdo, and 
Fofack (2003) and further developed by Agénor, Chen, and Grimm (2004). The 
growth rate of nominal consumption per capita is applied uniformly to each household 
in the survey, whereas the poverty line is updated with the price projections of the 
model. Thus, implicitly, growth is taken to be distribution neutral. The use of partial 
growth elasticities, by contrast, allows the user to assume that growth is non neutral, 
by using values that are either greater or lower than unity. Finally, the model is 
dynamic, and this allows the user to analyze the potential dynamic trade-offs that 
adjustment policies may entail regarding the impact of policy reforms, for instance 
between the short-run impact of higher public spending on education and health (on 
the budget, aggregate demand, and the real exchange rate) and the long-run effects 
on the productivity and supply of educated labor, and thus on long-run growth and 
poverty outcomes.  
 
                                                 
17These constraints could also affect the quality of public investment in infrastructure. In such 
conditions, the beneficial effects of aid could be further mitigated.   44
The second part of the paper described the application of the model to Ethiopia—
a country where the issue of how best to allocate public investment outlays to foster 
growth and reduce poverty is at the forefront of the policy agenda. After discussing 
estimation results and calibration issues, various simulations related to the allocation 
of aid and public investment were presented. The model was also used in 
“normative” mode to assess by how much nonfood foreign aid should increase in 
order to cut poverty in half between 2002 and 2015. The results showed that the 
required increase in foreign assistance could be sizable if the elasticity of poverty 
with respect to growth is small, despite the positive externalities generated by aid. 
Moreover, whether absorption constraints may prevent large increases in aid from 
being effective is an open question.
18 Thus, one should be cautious in interpreting 
our results regarding the feasibility of a “big push”, given current institutional 
constraints in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, our results are consistent with other recent 
studies (such as Nkusu (2004)), which emphasize the fact that in assessing the 
scope for Dutch disease effects associated with foreign aid, the possibility of a rapid 
supply response should not be discarded on a dogmatic basis. In addition, our 
analysis draws attention to the fact that, under a flexible exchange rate regime, 
substitution effects between aid and debt-creating capital flows may have a large 
impact on the behavior of the nominal exchange rate and thus on the magnitude of 
the real appreciation associated with increases in foreign assistance. 
 
Our framework can be extended in various directions. First, the model could be 
extended to a multi-household setting to account for distributional effects. A simple 
distinction would be, for instance, between wage earners and profits earners. 
Second, the model could be extended to account for a basic distinction between 
production sectors (say, rural and urban, as in Gelan (2002)). The magnitude of the 
poverty-reducing effect of growth depends not only on the overall rate of growth but 
also on the characteristics of the growth process, that is, the composition of growth—
                                                 
18A broader issue is whether foreign assistance is more desirable than trade in the presence of 
Dutch disease effects (that is, if aid generates a large real appreciation) and learning-by-doing 
externalities to exporting (through productivity spillovers); see Adam and O’Connell (2004).   45
an issue that the model cannot address, given its one-good nature.
19 Third, the one-
sector nature of the model also implies that we haven’t addressed the issue of the 
geographical allocation of public investment, that is, how much of an increase in, say, 
investment in infrastructure should go to rural areas, as opposed to urban areas. Our 
framework captures only “average” effects on growth, but it is possible that changes 
in the regional composition of a particular component of public investment (most 
notably infrastructure) could also spur growth above and beyond what averages 
would suggest, because for instance of differential productivity effects. All of these 
extensions could be dealt with in a Mini-IMMPA framework (see Agénor (2003)), 
which already incorporates a decomposition of public investment and their effects on 
the supply-side, or a simpler model like the one proposed by Stifel and Thorbecke 
(2003). These models would need, of course, to be modified to account for the 
various channels through which foreign aid affects the economy, as captured in this 
paper, and possibly integrate a more disaggregated agricultural sector. 
 
Fourth, the labor market structure could be developed further. In the present 
framework, all uneducated individuals are excluded from economic activity and thus 
openly unemployed. Also, the quantity of skilled labor is supply-constrained; 
expected rates of return on education play no role in individuals’ decisions to acquire 
skills. Put differently, there is no effect of relative wages on the demand for 
education. Doing so, however, would require introducing a market for education, with 
disequilibria between demand and supply affecting perhaps the quality of public 
education services rather than their price. Fifth, our model does not account for the 
fact that aid may finance initial investments (whether in education, health, or 
infrastructure) but then saddle governments with recurrent costs into the medium 
term that are not supported by donor assistance.  Accounting explicitly for recurrent 
spending would also help to stress the fact that there may be a trade-off between the 
quantity and quality of public capital. For instance, non-interest current expenditure 
could be disaggregated to distinguish between teachers’ salaries (as for instance in 
Agénor (2003)) and maintenance expenditure associated with health and 
                                                 
19See Demeke, Guta, and Ferede (2003) for a discussion of the sectoral pattern of growth in 
Ethiopia in recent years, and its implications for poverty reduction.   46
infrastructure, which could be modeled as a fraction of the lagged value of each 
capital stock. The first extension would allow the specification of a “public education 
input” (by combining the population of teachers with public capital in education) with 
the resulting composite input also subject to congestion. It would also allow the 
analyst to study the impact of changes in teachers’ pay on the production of 
educated labor (assuming as in Agénor (2003) for instance that the quality of 
teaching is a function of relative wages). The second would show indeed that higher 
investment does put pressure on the budget by increasing future recurrent 
expenditure; lack of maintenance expenditure could also increase the speed at which 
capital depreciates, as for instance in Agénor (2004e). Thus, a genuine trade-off may 
exist between increasing expenditure on new capital and spending more to maintain 
the efficiency of the existing capital stock. A possible issue to consider in this context 
is the case where foreign aid finances recurrent maintenance costs through direct 
budget support.  
 
All these extensions could be, of course, very valuable in and of themselves. 
At the same time, it is important to realize that some of them may bring greater 
complexity to our framework and would require significantly more resources to 
develop. For instance, moving from a one-good, one-household setting (to account 
explicitly for distributional issues) would require the construction of a social 
accounting matrix, for which reliable data may not be available. Data on maintenance 
costs by category of public capital stock are very difficult (if not impossible) to obtain, 
and this may limit the ability to estimate the relationship between these stocks and 
recurrent expenditure. One should not lose sight of the fact that, from an operational 
standpoint, ease of use is an important consideration, particularly in countries where 
human capacity and skills are scarce.   47
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T(LE, Kghea, POP) = AT·[βT·LE
-ρT + (1 - βT)(KGhea/POP
θH)
-ρT]
-1/ρT            (A1) 
 
J(T, KP) = AJ·[βJ·T
-ρJ + (1 - βJ)KP
-ρJ]
-1/ρJ                                           (A2) 
 
Ys(J, KGinf, QUAL) = AY·[βY·J
-ρY + (1 - βY)(QUAL·KGinf/Ys-1
θI)
 -ρY]
-1/ρY          (A3) 
 
X/DOM = {(PX/PD)·[(1 - βDE)/βDE]}
σDE                                               (A4) 
 
PX = ER·PX*                                                    (A5) 
 
PY·Ys = PD·DOM + PX·X                                           (A6) 
 
 
Population and Labor Supply 
 
POP = (1+n)POP-1                                                                     (A7) 
 
LR = (1+n)LR-1                                                                          (A8) 
 
LEN = AE·[βE·(LR-1)
-ρE + (1 - βE){KGedu-1/(LR-1)
θE}
-ρE]
-1/ρE                  (A9) 
 
LE = (1 - δE)LE-1 + LEN                                                             (A10) 
 
Household Income and Consumption 
 
  Ydisp = PY·Ys - TAX - RP*·ER·FdebtP-1 + RD·DdebtG-1 + ER·UTR$         (A11) 
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CP = CP(Ydisp/PQ, CP-1)                                          (A12) 
 
Qd = (CP+CG) + (IP+IG)                                           (A13) 
 
M/DOM = {(PD/PM)·[(1 - βDM)/βDM]}
σ
DM                                             (A14) 
 
PM = (1+tm)·ER·PM*                                            (A15) 
 
KP = IP-1 + (1 - δP)KP-1                                                               (A16) 
 
Government Budget and Foreign Aid 
 
GBAL = TAX + AID - PQ(CG+IG) - RG*·ER·FdebtG-1 - RD·DdebtG-1         (A17) 
 
AID = ER·(FAID$ + NFAID$)                                     (A18) 
 
DdebtG = DB + DdebtG-1                                                           (A19) 
 
IGh = κh·IG with h = edu, hea, inf, and Σκh = 1                       (A20) 
 
TAX = TXR(GTOT/NGDP, AID/NGDP)·PQ·Qs + tm·ER·PM*·M              (A21) 
 
NGDP = PQ·Qd + PX·X - PM·M                                 (A22) 
 
GTOT = PQ·(CG + IG) + RG*·ER·FdebtG-1 + RD·DdebtG-1                      (A23) 
 
PQ·CG/NGDP = cg[(TAX/NGDP)-1, ER·AID$/NGDP, (PQ·CG/NGDP)-1]       (A24) 
 
PQ·IG/NGDP = ig[(TAX/NGDP)-1, ER·NFAID$/NGDP, (ER·NFAID$/NGDP)^2, 
RG*·ER·FdebtG-1/NGDP].    (A25) 
 




Balance of Payments and Foreign Debt 
 
PX*·X - PM*·M  - RG*·FdebtG-1 - RP*·FdebtP-1  + UTR$                    (A27) 
 
                               + (FAID$ + NFAID$) + FG + FP - DNFA = 0   
 
FdebtP = FP + FdebtP-1                                                                    (A28) 
 
FdebtG = FG + FdebtG-1                                                                   (A29) 
 
FdebtTot = FdebtP + FdebtG                                         (A30) 
 
  
Market Equilibrium and Domestic Prices 
 









)                           (A32) 
 
PQ·Q = PD·DOM + PM·M                                            (A33) 
 
Deficit Financing, Private Savings and Investment 
 
 
GBAL = TAX + AID - GTOT                                         (A34) 
 
- GBAL = DB + FG                                                  (A35) 
 
SP = Ydisp - PQ·CP                                                (A36) 
 
PQ·IP/NGDP = IP[∆Ys/Ys-1, Kginf/Ys-1
θI, ER·FP/NGDP, ER·FdebtTot/NGDP]     (A37)   50
 
Appendix B 






AID  Total aid measured in domestic-currency terms 
CG  Real public spending on consumption 
CP  Total private consumption in real terms 
DdebtG  Domestic public debt stock (direct borrowing) 
DOM Domestic  sales 
ER Nominal  exchange  rate 
FdebtG  Stock of foreign debt 
FdebtP  Stock of private foreign debt  
FdebtTot Total  external  debt 
GBAL  Government budget balance 
GTOT  Total government expenditure 
IG  Real public spending on investment 
IGedu  Real public investment in education 
IGhea  Real public investment in health 
IGinf  Real public investment in infrastructure 
IP  Real private spending on investment 
J  Composite input from the supply of composite input T and private 
capital, KP 
KGedu  Stock of public capital in education 
KGhea  Public capital in health 
KGinf Public  capital  in infrastructure 
KP Private  capital 
LE, LEN  Educated labor (stock and flow) 
LR Raw  labor 
M  Demand for imported goods (in real terms) 
NGDP  Nominal gross domestic product  
PD  Price of the domestic good 
PM  Domestic-currency price of imports  
POP  Size of the population 
PQ Composite  price  index 
PX  Domestic-currency price of exports 
PY GDP  deflator 
Qd  Total demand for goods sold on the domestic market (which 
includes both imports and domestically-produced goods) 
Qs  Domestic sales excluding food aid 
s  Marginal propensity to save 
SP Private  savings   51
T  “Effective” labor; composite input from the supply of educated 
labor, LE, and the stock of public capital in health, Kghea 
TAX  Total tax revenue 
TXR  Effective tax rate 
X  Exports  (in real terms) 
Ydisp  Households’ disposable income in nominal terms 
Ys  Aggregate supply of domestic goods (in real terms) 




κh  Share of public investment in h with h = edu, hea, inf, and Σκh = 1 
DB  Flow of direct domestic borrowing 
DNFA  Change in net foreign assets of the central bank 
FAID$  Food aid in foreign-currency terms 
FG  Flow of government borrowing abroad 
FP Private  capital  inflows 
LAND  Land (normalized to unity) 
n  Growth rate of population and raw labor 
NFAID$  Nonfood aid in foreign-currency terms 
PM*  World price of imports 
PX*  World price of exports 
QUAL  Index of the quality of infrastructure 
RD  Interest rate on domestic public debt 
RG*  Interest rate on public foreign debt 
RP*  Interest rate on private foreign borrowing 
tm Tariff  rate 
UTR$ Private  unrequited  transfers 
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Parameters and Estimated Values 
 
Variable Definition 
θE  Parameter capturing congestion effects in the education system 
θH  Parameter determining the strength of congestion effects in the 
provision of health services 
θI  Parameter capturing congestion effects on infrastructure capital 
ADE  Shift parameter in production of domestic goods Ys 
ADM  shift parameter in production of Qs 
AE  Shift parameter in flow production of educated labor LE 
AJ  Shift parameter for composite input J 
AT  Shift parameter for composite input T 
AY  Shift parameter for composite input Ys 
βDE  Share parameter between exports EXP and domestic sales DOM in 
production of domestic goods Ys 
βDM  Share parameter between imports M and demand for domestic goods 
DOM 
βE  Share parameter between educated labor LE and public capital in 
education, Kgedu in flow production of LE 
βJ  Share parameter between the supply of T and the stock of private 
capital, KP in production of J 
βT  Share parameter between the supply of educated labor, LE, and the 
stock of public capital in health, Kghea in production of T 
βY  Share parameter between the supply of J and public capital in 
infrastructure, Kginf in production of Ys 
δE  Rate of depreciation, or “de-skilling,” of educated labor 
δh  Depreciation rate of public capital with h = edu, hea, inf 
δP  Constant rate of depreciation 
ρDE  transformation parameter in production of domestic goods Ys 
ρDM  Transformation parameter in Qs 
ρE  Substitution parameter in flow production of LE 
ρJ  Substitution parameter in production of J 
ρT  Substitution parameter in production of T 
ρY  Substitution parameter in production of Ys 
σDE  = 1/(1-ρDE); elasticity of transformation between exports and domestic 
sales 
σDM  = 1/(1+ρDM); elasticity of transformation between imports and demand 
for domestic goods 
σE   = 1/(1+ρE); elasticity of substitution between LR-1 and KGedu/(LR-1)
θE 
σJ =  1/(1+ρJ); elasticity of substitution between T and KP 
σT  = 1/(1+ρT); elasticity of substitution between LE and Kghea/POP
θH 
σY =  1/(1+ρY); elasticity of substitution between J and KGinf 
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Appendix C 
Data Sources and Parameter Estimates 
 
  This Appendix provides a brief description of the sources of aid and 
government fixed capital formation data for Ethiopia, as used in this paper, and the 
parameters used in calibrating and simulating the model.
20 The data are annual and 
cover various years during the period 1975-2002. The data source for foreign aid 
flows is the CRS/OECD and DAC/OECD database. The components of aid are food 
aid, measured as the sum of ODA grants for Food Aid and Relief Food Aid, and 
nonfood aid, measured as the difference between total ODA grants and food aid. 
Data on Government fixed capital formation are taken from national accounts. The 
distinction between the three categories of public investment (health, education, and 
infrastructure) is obtained by imposing the respective shares reported in the fiscal 
accounts provided by Ethiopia’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 
 
  Parameter values are chosen as follows (see also the discussion in the text). 
Three different parameters are used to capture congestion effects. θE, which 
captures congestion effects in the education system, is set at 0.3. θH, which 
determines the strength of congestion effects in the provision of health services, is 
0.1. θI, which captures congestion effects on infrastructure capital, is 0.2. The rate of 
depreciation of public capital (education, health, and infrastructure), δh, is 0.025. The 
depreciation rate of private capital, δP, is 0.04. The rate of de-skilling of educated 
labor, δE, is 0.03.  
 
Six different elasticity parameters are included in the model. The elasticity of 
transformation between exports and domestic sales, σDE, is 0.3. Both the elasticity 
of substitution between T and KP, σJ, and the elasticity of substitution between LE 
and Kghea/POP
θH, σT, are set equal to 0.3. The elasticity of transformation between 
imports and demand for domestic goods, σDM, is set at 0.4. The elasticity of 
substitution between LR-1 and KGedu/(LR-1)
θE,  σE, is also set at 0.4. Finally, the 
elasticity of substitution between J and KGinf, σY, is taken to be 0.5. 
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Structure of the Model








Ethiopia: GDP per capita and Aid per capita, 1974-2002





































































GDP per capita Aid per capita (right scale) 
Note: Aid is defined as total net official development assistance. The series are taken from OECD. 





































































Non-food aid Food aid (right scale)  Loans (right scale)
Note: Food aid is defined as food Aid, including relief food aid. Non-food aid is the difference between total 
net official development aid and food aid.





































































Aid (in percent of tax revenue)
Aid (in percent of general government final consumption expenditure) 
Note: Aid is defined as total net official development assistance. The series are taken from 
OECD and government authorities. 
Source: OECD and government authorities.   65
 
Figure 5
Ethiopia: Public Investment and Non-food Aid
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Source: Government authorities. 
Figure 7

































































Health Education Infrastructure Others  68
Figure 8





































































     Note: The quality index is calculated by using two series. The first is 
calculated with electric power transmission and distribution losses in percent of 
output (weighted average of interconnected system loss rate and self-contained 
system loss rate). The second is calculated with the percent of good roads. We 
subtract the mean value of each series from each observation and divide the 
result by the standard error of the series. The unweighted average of these two 
series is used to define the quality index. 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real Sector (in billions of current birrs)
Total resources 69.1 75.5 82.3 90.1 98.4 107.2 116.4 126.1 136.2 146.7 157.8 169.4 181.7 195.0
    Gross domestic product at market prices 51.8 57.4 63.0 69.4 76.1 83.1 90.4 97.8 105.4 113.2 121.0 128.8 136.6 144.3
    Imports of goods and NFS (inclusive of tariffs) 17.3 18.1 19.3 20.7 22.3 24.0 26.0 28.2 30.7 33.6 36.8 40.6 45.1 50.7
Total expenditure 69.1 75.5 82.3 90.1 98.4 107.2 116.4 126.0 136.2 146.7 157.8 169.4 181.7 195.0
  Total consumption 50.8 55.3 60.6 66.5 72.7 79.1 85.8 92.6 99.5 106.5 113.6 120.7 127.8 134.6
      Private consumption 35.8 37.1 39.8 43.2 46.9 50.8 54.9 59.0 63.3 67.6 71.9 76.2 80.4 84.5
      Public consumption 15.0 18.2 20.7 23.2 25.8 28.3 30.9 33.6 36.3 39.0 41.8 44.6 47.3 50.1
  Total investment 10.4 12.3 13.8 15.4 17.1 18.8 20.7 22.6 24.6 26.6 28.7 30.8 33.0 35.2
      Private investment 5.0 6.1 6.8 7.4 8.2 8.9 9.8 10.7 11.6 12.6 13.6 14.7 15.7 16.8
      Public investment 5.4 6.2 7.0 7.9 8.9 9.9 10.9 11.9 12.9 14.0 15.1 16.2 17.3 18.4
  Exports of goods and NFS 7.9 7.8 8.0 8.2 8.6 9.2 9.9 10.9 12.1 13.6 15.4 17.8 21.0 25.2
Poverty rate
 (2000=44.2%)
   Poverty headcount index (survey data) 39.0 40.8 39.9 38.6 37.5 36.5 35.9 35.6 35.5 35.6 35.6 35.7 35.7 35.4
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 43.7 42.9 41.9 41.1 40.6 40.2 39.9 39.6 39.4 39.3 39.1 38.9 38.7 38.4
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 43.2 41.6 39.6 38.2 37.2 36.5 35.9 35.5 35.1 34.8 34.5 34.2 33.8 33.2
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.8 42.3 39.5 36.2 33.9 32.3 31.1 30.2 29.5 29.0 28.6 28.1 27.7 27.1 26.3
External Sector (% of GDP)
Current account -5.7 -5.0 -5.2 -5.3 -5.3 -5.2 -5.1 -5.1 -5.0 -4.9 -4.9 -4.8 -4.7 -4.6
    Trade balance -18.3 -17.9 -18.0 -18.0 -17.9 -17.9 -17.8 -17.7 -17.7 -17.7 -17.7 -17.7 -17.7 -17.7
       Exports of goods and NFS 15.2 13.7 12.6 11.9 11.3 11.1 11.0 11.1 11.5 12.0 12.8 13.8 15.3 17.5
       Imports of goods and NFS 33.5 31.5 30.7 29.9 29.3 28.9 28.8 28.9 29.2 29.7 30.4 31.5 33.0 35.1
    Private unrequited transfers 5.8 5.3 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.5
    Income (net) -0.7 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0
       Public -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0
       Private 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
    Aid, total 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6
    Other current account flows (net) -4.2 -3.8 -3.5 -3.3 -3.1 -2.9 -2.8 -2.7 -2.6 -2.5 -2.4 -2.3 -2.2 -2.0
Capital account 10.8 9.4 9.9 10.0 9.9 9.8 9.6 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.0 8.8 8.6
    Private borrowing 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
    Public borrowing 9.9 8.7 9.1 9.3 9.2 9.1 9.0 8.9 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 7.9
    Errors and omissions 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government Sector (% of GDP)
Total revenue 32.4 33.3 34.4 35.2 35.8 36.3 36.8 37.1 37.5 37.8 38.1 38.5 38.9 39.4
    Domestic taxes 13.8 15.1 16.3 17.3 18.0 18.6 19.1 19.4 19.7 19.9 20.1 20.2 20.3 20.4
    Indirect taxes on imports 7.0 6.6 6.4 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.9 7.4
    Foreign aid (Grants) 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.6
       Food aid 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
       Nonfood aid 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.3
Total expenditure 41.4 44.0 45.5 46.4 47.0 47.4 47.7 48.0 48.2 48.4 48.6 48.8 49.0 49.3
    Consumption 29.1 31.7 32.9 33.5 33.9 34.1 34.2 34.3 34.4 34.5 34.5 34.6 34.6 34.7
     Investment 10.4 10.8 11.1 11.4 11.7 11.9 12.0 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.8
     Interest payments 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8
        Payments on domestic debt 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9
        Payments on foreign debt 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0
Overall fiscal balance -9.0 -10.7 -11.1 -11.3 -11.2 -11.1 -11.0 -10.9 -10.8 -10.7 -10.5 -10.4 -10.2 -9.9
Total financing 9.0 10.7 11.1 11.3 11.2 11.1 11.0 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.5 10.4 10.2 9.9
    Foreign financing 9.9 8.7 9.1 9.3 9.2 9.1 9.0 8.9 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.2 7.9
    Domestic borrowing -0.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Prices and Exchange Rates
Composite good price (% change) -7.2 2.8 3.2 3.8 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.0 2.5 1.7
Nominal exchange rate (% change) 2.6 0.2 1.3 2.1 2.7 3.3 3.7 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.1
Real exchange rate (% change) 7.4 -2.6 -1.9 -1.7 -1.3 -0.9 -0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.8 2.4
Memorandum items
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) -0.1 5.2 3.6 3.3 2.7 2.1 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9
Real disposable income per capita (% change) -1.5 3.7 4.7 3.5 2.7 2.0 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.6
Private savings rate (% of GDP) 17.2 20.7 23.3 24.7 25.5 26.3 26.9 27.5 28.1 28.8 29.5 30.2 31.1 32.1
Real private consumption per capita (% change) -8.2 -1.9 0.9 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.3
Private investment (% of GDP) 9.7 10.7 10.8 10.7 10.7 10.8 10.8 10.9 11.0 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6
Private investment (% of total investment) 48.3 49.6 49.2 48.4 47.9 47.6 47.4 47.3 47.4 47.5 47.5 47.6 47.7 47.7
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 25.2 24.6 24.5 24.7 24.9 25.0 25.2 25.3 25.4 25.5 25.6 25.7 25.8 25.9
   Health (% of public investment) 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8 45.8
   Education (% of public investment) 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6
Food aid (% of total revenue) 13.5 13.1 12.7 12.4 12.2 12.0 11.9 11.8 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.2 11.1
Food aid (% of total foreign aid) 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5
Nonfood aid (% of total public investment) 69.9 67.2 65.5 63.7 62.3 61.3 60.6 59.9 59.4 58.9 58.5 58.1 57.6 57.1
Nonfood aid (% of total foreign aid) 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5 62.5
Domestic debt (% of GDP) 36.0 34.5 33.4 32.4 31.5 30.8 30.4 30.1 29.9 29.8 29.9 30.1 30.4 30.8
External debt (% of GDP) 64.2 67.4 72.0 76.7 81.7 86.9 92.5 98.4 104.5 110.8 117.3 124.0 130.7 137.4
Interest payment on external public debt (% of exports) 5.5 3.6 4.1 4.5 5.0 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.2 5.9 5.4
Degree of openness (total trade in % of GDP) 48.7 45.2 43.3 41.7 40.6 40.0 39.8 40.0 40.6 41.7 43.2 45.4 48.3 52.6
Educated labor (in % of population) 41.5 40.5 39.5 38.7 37.9 37.1 36.4 35.8 35.2 34.7 34.2 33.8 33.3 32.9
Years
Table 1
Ethiopia: Trend-based Projections, 2003-152002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real Sector
Total resources 0.00 0.43 0.68 0.84 1.02 1.21 1.44 1.69 1.96 2.24 2.54 2.87 3.17 3.45
    Gross domestic product at market prices 0.00 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.26 -0.14 0.04 0.27 0.52 0.79 1.09 1.42 1.72 2.00
    Imports of goods and NFS (inclusive of tariffs) 0.00 3.01 4.42 5.65 6.75 7.69 8.47 9.14 9.74 10.23 10.63 11.02 11.40 11.73
Total expenditure 0.00 0.44 0.68 0.84 1.02 1.22 1.44 1.69 1.95 2.23 2.55 2.86 3.16 3.48
  Total consumption 0.00 -0.26 -0.32 -0.34 -0.30 -0.19 -0.02 0.19 0.43 0.70 0.99 1.28 1.57 1.86
      Private consumption 0.00 -0.23 -0.35 -0.40 -0.36 -0.26 -0.09 0.12 0.35 0.62 0.90 1.18 1.46 1.74
      Public consumption 0.00 -0.32 -0.25 -0.25 -0.19 -0.08 0.08 0.30 0.54 0.81 1.11 1.43 1.72 2.02
  Total investment 0.00 2.87 3.33 3.49 3.65 3.82 4.04 4.29 4.57 4.87 5.20 5.54 5.88 6.22
      Private investment 0.00 -0.33 -0.22 -0.05 0.17 0.43 0.72 1.07 1.43 1.82 2.24 2.68 3.11 3.53
      Public investment 0.00 6.00 6.48 6.38 6.37 6.43 6.56 6.76 7.00 7.27 7.57 7.88 8.17 8.50
  Exports of goods and NFS 0.00 1.54 3.67 6.09 8.67 11.24 13.71 15.97 17.87 19.58 21.13 22.36 23.21 23.95
Poverty rate
1 (2000=44.2%)
   Poverty headcount index (survey data) 0.00 -0.13 -0.34 -0.72 -1.15 -1.79 -1.93 -2.32 -2.86 -3.12 -3.15 -3.40 -3.65 -3.65
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 0.00 -0.05 -0.13 -0.25 -0.38 -0.52 -0.64 -0.75 -0.84 -0.93 -0.99 -1.05 -1.09 -1.12
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 0.00 -0.09 -0.27 -0.50 -0.77 -1.03 -1.28 -1.51 -1.70 -1.87 -2.01 -2.13 -2.23 -2.31
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.8 0.00 -0.16 -0.48 -0.90 -1.37 -1.85 -2.31 -2.72 -3.08 -3.41 -3.69 -3.94 -4.15 -4.34
External Sector (% of GDP)
1
Current account 0.00 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
    Trade balance 0.00 -0.74 -0.84 -0.90 -0.93 -0.96 -0.98 -0.99 -1.01 -1.02 -1.02 -1.01 -1.02 -1.02
       Exports of goods and NFS 0.00 0.24 0.42 0.56 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.65
       Imports of goods and NFS 0.00 0.98 1.26 1.45 1.57 1.64 1.67 1.69 1.70 1.70 1.69 1.68 1.68 1.68
    Private unrequited transfers 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
    Income (net) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
       Public 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
       Private 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Aid, total 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
    Other current account flows (net) 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
Capital account 0.00 -0.48 -0.32 -0.23 -0.17 -0.13 -0.10 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
    Private borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
    Public borrowing 0.00 -0.49 -0.32 -0.24 -0.18 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03
    Errors and omissions 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Government Sector (% of GDP)
1
Total revenue 0.00 1.18 1.17 1.15 1.12 1.10 1.07 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.01
    Domestic taxes 0.00 -0.02 -0.09 -0.16 -0.21 -0.25 -0.28 -0.30 -0.32 -0.32 -0.33 -0.35 -0.35 -0.34
    Indirect taxes on imports 0.00 0.21 0.26 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
    Foreign aid (Grants) 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
       Food aid 0.00 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37
       Nonfood aid 0.00 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
Total expenditure 0.00 0.69 0.85 0.91 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97
    Consumption 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
     Investment 0.00 0.69 0.83 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
     Interest payments 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
        Payments on domestic debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
        Payments on foreign debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overall fiscal balance 0.00 0.49 0.32 0.24 0.18 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03
Total financing 0.00 -0.49 -0.32 -0.24 -0.18 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03
    Foreign financing 0.00 -0.49 -0.32 -0.24 -0.18 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03
    Domestic borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Prices and Exchange Rates
1
Composite good price (% change) 0.00 -0.34 -0.36 -0.40 -0.39 -0.34 -0.27 -0.18 -0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.16
Nominal exchange rate (% change) 0.00 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.29
Real exchange rate (% change) 0.00 0.47 0.51 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.54 0.45 0.39 0.31 0.21 0.14 0.13
Memorandum items
1
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.00 -0.02 0.37 0.40 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.43 0.38 0.32 0.28 0.26 0.18 0.14
Real disposable income per capita (% change) 0.00 0.21 0.40 0.54 0.60 0.60 0.56 0.49 0.41 0.35 0.29 0.22 0.16 0.13
Private savings rate (% of GDP) 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.36 0.49 0.60 0.69 0.76 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.89
Real private consumption per capita (% change) 0.00 0.10 0.22 0.33 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.33 0.29 0.24 0.18 0.15 0.13
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.19
Private investment (% of total investment) 0.00 -1.54 -1.61 -1.54 -1.47 -1.42 -1.38 -1.34 -1.31 -1.28 -1.25 -1.22 -1.18 -1.16
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.00 1.16 1.27 1.29 1.29 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.29 1.29 1.29
   Health (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Education (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Food aid (% of total revenue) 0.00 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.57
Food aid (% of total foreign aid) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nonfood aid (% of total public investment) 0.00 1.42 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.01 0.99
Nonfood aid (% of total foreign aid) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Domestic debt (% of GDP) 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.12 -0.16 -0.21 -0.26 -0.30 -0.33
External debt (% of GDP) 0.00 -0.22 -0.44 -0.51 -0.54 -0.53 -0.50 -0.48 -0.45 -0.41 -0.40 -0.46 -0.50 -0.51
Interest payments on external public debt (% of exports) 0.00 -0.05 -0.18 -0.35 -0.58 -0.85 -1.15 -1.47 -1.79 -2.10 -2.40 -2.68 -2.90 -3.10
Degree of openness (total trade in % of GDP) 0.00 1.22 1.68 2.01 2.21 2.32 2.37 2.38 2.39 2.38 2.36 2.34 2.34 2.33
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07




1 Percentage Point Increase in Aid to GDP Ratio
(Percentage deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real Sector
Total resources 0.00 0.27 0.32 0.38 0.45 0.53 0.62 0.74 0.86 1.00 1.14 1.29 1.45 1.59
    Gross domestic product at market prices 0.00 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.35 0.45 0.56 0.68 0.82 0.97 1.12 1.27 1.42
    Imports of goods and NFS (inclusive of tariffs) 0.00 0.61 0.81 1.01 1.19 1.36 1.52 1.68 1.83 1.98 2.13 2.29 2.43 2.58
Total expenditure 0.00 0.27 0.32 0.38 0.45 0.53 0.62 0.74 0.86 1.00 1.14 1.29 1.45 1.60
  Total consumption 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.07 0.16 0.26 0.38 0.51 0.65 0.79 0.94
      Private consumption 0.00 -0.09 -0.19 -0.24 -0.27 -0.26 -0.22 -0.16 -0.07 0.04 0.15 0.27 0.40 0.54
      Public consumption 0.00 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.32 0.40 0.50 0.61 0.74 0.88 1.03 1.18 1.33 1.49
  Total investment 0.00 1.60 1.81 1.96 2.11 2.24 2.37 2.51 2.65 2.80 2.96 3.12 3.28 3.45
      Private investment 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.28 0.41 0.55 0.69 0.85 1.02 1.20 1.39 1.58 1.78 1.98
      Public investment 0.00 3.11 3.26 3.34 3.43 3.53 3.65 3.77 3.91 4.05 4.21 4.37 4.53 4.69
  Exports of goods and NFS 0.00 0.10 0.33 0.59 0.88 1.18 1.48 1.79 2.10 2.40 2.68 2.95 3.19 3.38
Poverty rate
1 (2000=44.2%)
   Poverty headcount index (survey data) 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.11 -0.31 -0.49 -0.51 -0.82 -0.92 -1.17 -1.21 -1.41 -1.62 -1.49
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 -0.15 -0.20 -0.26 -0.31 -0.36 -0.40 -0.44 -0.48 -0.51
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.10 -0.19 -0.30 -0.41 -0.52 -0.63 -0.73 -0.82 -0.91 -0.99 -1.06
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.8 0.00 0.04 -0.05 -0.18 -0.34 -0.53 -0.74 -0.94 -1.15 -1.34 -1.53 -1.70 -1.86 -2.01
External Sector (% of GDP)
1
Current account 0.00 -0.14 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19
    Trade balance 0.00 -0.14 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14
       Exports of goods and NFS 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
       Imports of goods and NFS 0.00 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20
    Private unrequited transfers 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
    Income (net) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
       Public 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
       Private 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Aid, total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Other current account flows (net) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
Capital account 0.00 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
    Private borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
    Public borrowing 0.00 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36
    Errors and omissions 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Government Sector (% of GDP)
1
Total revenue 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17
    Domestic taxes 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13
    Indirect taxes on imports 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
    Foreign aid (Grants) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
       Food aid 0.00 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29
       Nonfood aid 0.00 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Total expenditure 0.00 0.32 0.38 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.53
    Consumption 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
     Investment 0.00 0.32 0.37 0.41 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
     Interest payments 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
        Payments on domestic debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
        Payments on foreign debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Overall fiscal balance 0.00 -0.27 -0.30 -0.32 -0.33 -0.34 -0.34 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36
Total financing 0.00 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36
    Foreign financing 0.00 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36
    Domestic borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Prices and Exchange Rates
1
Composite good price (% change) 0.00 -0.07 -0.14 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.14 -0.12 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.03
Nominal exchange rate (% change) 0.00 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05
Real exchange rate (% change) 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02
Memorandum items
1
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.00 0.26 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.12
Real disposable income per capita (% change) 0.00 -0.05 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13
Private savings rate (% of GDP) 0.00 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.27
Real private consumption per capita (% change) 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.11
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07
Private investment (% of total investment) 0.00 -0.75 -0.76 -0.74 -0.73 -0.72 -0.71 -0.70 -0.69 -0.68 -0.68 -0.67 -0.66 -0.65
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.00 0.54 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
   Health (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Education (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Food aid (% of total revenue) 0.00 -0.80 -0.73 -0.69 -0.67 -0.65 -0.64 -0.64 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 -0.62 -0.62 -0.62
Food aid (% of total foreign aid) 0.00 -2.47 -2.47 -2.47 -2.47 -2.47 -2.47 -2.47 -2.47 -2.47 -2.47 -2.47 -2.47 -2.47
Nonfood aid (% of total public investment) 0.00 0.66 0.52 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34
Nonfood aid (% of total foreign aid) 0.00 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47
Domestic debt (% of GDP) 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.15 -0.17 -0.19 -0.20 -0.22
External debt (% of GDP) 0.00 0.13 0.35 0.56 0.75 0.93 1.11 1.28 1.46 1.65 1.84 2.05 2.26 2.50
Interest payments on external public debt (% of exports) 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.21
Degree of openness (total trade in % of GDP) 0.00 0.12 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04




Permanent Reduction in the Share of Food Aid in Total Aid by 2 Percentage Points
(Percentage deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real Sector
Total resources 0.00 0.00 -0.61 -0.60 -0.33 0.00 0.33 0.65 0.95 1.22 1.48 1.74 1.96 2.18
    Gross domestic product at market prices 0.00 0.00 -0.30 -0.09 0.27 0.65 1.00 1.33 1.61 1.87 2.11 2.37 2.58 2.79
    Imports of goods and NFS (inclusive of tariffs) 0.00 0.00 -1.78 -2.66 -3.02 -3.10 -3.03 -2.89 -2.63 -2.38 -2.07 -1.84 -1.58 -1.29
Total expenditure 0.00 0.00 -0.61 -0.60 -0.33 0.00 0.33 0.66 0.95 1.22 1.45 1.69 1.94 2.19
  Total consumption 0.00 -2.33 -3.10 -3.03 -2.69 -2.31 -1.95 -1.62 -1.33 -1.07 -0.84 -0.61 -0.36 -0.11
      Private consumption 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.87 1.30 1.65 1.91 2.13 2.31 2.46 2.58 2.71 2.88 3.05
      Public consumption 0.00 -7.00 -9.33 -9.53 -9.03 -8.36 -7.70 -7.10 -6.57 -6.09 -5.67 -5.26 -4.87 -4.49
  Total investment 0.00 10.34 9.37 8.94 8.88 8.99 9.16 9.34 9.51 9.68 9.81 9.95 10.07 10.20
      Private investment 0.00 0.00 0.92 2.03 3.14 4.14 5.00 5.73 6.33 6.83 7.23 7.59 7.90 8.19
      Public investment 0.00 20.47 16.84 14.59 13.38 12.70 12.33 12.11 11.98 11.92 11.87 11.87 11.87 11.91
  Exports of goods and NFS 0.00 0.00 -0.39 -1.25 -2.38 -3.56 -4.64 -5.48 -6.26 -6.75 -7.06 -7.06 -7.06 -6.93
Poverty rate
1 (2000=44.2%)
   Poverty headcount index (survey data) 0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.04 0.19 0.38 0.61 0.80 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.81 0.41 0.39
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.14 0.09
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 0.14 0.29 0.40 0.47 0.51 0.50 0.45 0.36 0.28 0.20
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.8 0.00 0.00 -0.16 -0.02 0.25 0.52 0.74 0.87 0.94 0.92 0.84 0.68 0.53 0.38
External Sector (% of GDP)
1
Current account 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.44
    Trade balance 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.52 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.41
       Exports of goods and NFS 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.10 -0.19 -0.25 -0.28 -0.30 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.30 -0.29 -0.29
       Imports of goods and NFS 0.00 0.00 -0.40 -0.62 -0.73 -0.78 -0.79 -0.79 -0.77 -0.76 -0.73 -0.73 -0.71 -0.70
    Private unrequited transfers 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08
    Income (net) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07
       Public 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07
       Private 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Aid, total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Other current account flows (net) 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
Capital account 0.00 0.00 -0.75 -1.02 -1.06 -1.04 -1.00 -0.97 -0.92 -0.89 -0.85 -0.86 -0.84 -0.83
    Private borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
    Public borrowing 0.00 0.00 -0.75 -1.02 -1.06 -1.03 -0.99 -0.96 -0.92 -0.88 -0.84 -0.84 -0.83 -0.81
    Errors and omissions 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Government Sector (% of GDP)
1
Total revenue 0.00 0.00 -0.16 -0.29 -0.38 -0.44 -0.47 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.51 -0.49 -0.47
    Domestic taxes 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.16 -0.23 -0.28 -0.31 -0.33 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.35 -0.34 -0.33
    Indirect taxes on imports 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.13 -0.15 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15
    Foreign aid (Grants) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
       Food aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
       Nonfood aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total expenditure 0.00 0.00 -0.92 -1.31 -1.44 -1.47 -1.46 -1.44 -1.41 -1.38 -1.37 -1.35 -1.32 -1.29
    Consumption 0.00 -2.22 -3.02 -3.24 -3.25 -3.17 -3.08 -2.98 -2.90 -2.82 -2.75 -2.70 -2.63 -2.56
     Investment 0.00 2.22 2.09 1.94 1.81 1.72 1.65 1.58 1.53 1.49 1.45 1.41 1.38 1.36
     Interest payments 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08
        Payments on domestic debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
        Payments on foreign debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07
Overall fiscal balance 0.00 0.00 0.75 1.02 1.06 1.03 0.99 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.84 0.85 0.83 0.81
Total financing 0.00 0.00 -0.75 -1.02 -1.06 -1.03 -0.99 -0.96 -0.92 -0.88 -0.84 -0.85 -0.83 -0.81
    Foreign financing 0.00 0.00 -0.75 -1.02 -1.06 -1.03 -0.99 -0.96 -0.92 -0.88 -0.84 -0.84 -0.83 -0.81
    Domestic borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Prices and Exchange Rates
1
Composite good price (% change) 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.57 0.64 0.59 0.49 0.38 0.28 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02
Nominal exchange rate (% change) 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.06 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 -0.07 -0.02 0.01
Real exchange rate (% change) 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.31 -0.42 -0.45 -0.43 -0.38 -0.33 -0.24 -0.19 -0.11 -0.06 -0.01
Memorandum items
1
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.00 0.00 -0.62 -0.35 -0.24 -0.17 -0.11 -0.02 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.20
Real disposable income per capita (% change) 0.00 0.00 0.20 -0.18 -0.33 -0.33 -0.25 -0.15 -0.07 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.18 0.18
Private savings rate (% of GDP) 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.16 0.05 -0.03 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.03
Real private consumption per capita (% change) 0.00 0.00 0.09 -0.05 -0.17 -0.22 -0.20 -0.14 -0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.14
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.23 0.31 0.38 0.44 0.50 0.54 0.58 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.68
Private investment (% of total investment) 0.00 -4.64 -3.63 -2.85 -2.31 -1.93 -1.65 -1.43 -1.27 -1.14 -1.04 -0.96 -0.89 -0.84
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.00 5.04 5.07 4.82 4.55 4.31 4.12 3.96 3.83 3.72 3.62 3.53 3.45 3.37
   Health (% of public investment) 0.00 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.00 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
   Education (% of public investment) 0.00 2.79 2.79 2.79 2.79 2.79 2.79 2.79 2.79 2.79 2.79 2.79 2.79 2.79
Food aid (% of total revenue) 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09
Food aid (% of total foreign aid) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nonfood aid (% of total public investment) 0.00 -11.42 -8.78 -7.08 -6.07 -5.43 -5.01 -4.71 -4.49 -4.32 -4.18 -4.06 -3.96 -3.88
Nonfood aid (% of total foreign aid) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Domestic debt (% of GDP) 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.02 -0.07 -0.16 -0.23 -0.28 -0.32 -0.35 -0.37 -0.39 -0.41 -0.42
External debt (% of GDP) 0.00 0.00 -0.45 -1.39 -2.42 -3.41 -4.34 -5.24 -6.09 -6.91 -7.72 -8.53 -9.30 -10.05
Interest payments on external public debt (% of exports) 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.16 -0.27 -0.42 -0.57 -0.74
Degree of openness (total trade in % of GDP) 0.00 0.00 -0.41 -0.72 -0.92 -1.03 -1.08 -1.09 -1.08 -1.07 -1.04 -1.03 -1.01 -0.98
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.33




7 Percent Decrease in Government Consumption Reallocated to Public Investment; Allocated to, Respectively, 2.8, 3.5 and 0.7 Increases in the Shares of Education, Health, and Infrastructure in Total Investment
(Percentage deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real Sector
Total resources 0.00 3.70 5.43 6.86 8.40 10.10 12.01 14.12 16.48 19.00 21.71 24.58 27.52 30.53
    Gross domestic product at market prices 0.00 -0.59 -0.35 -0.05 0.63 1.68 3.10 4.84 6.86 9.10 11.54 14.14 16.82 19.56
    Imports of goods and NFS (inclusive of tariffs) 0.00 18.31 27.20 35.40 43.19 50.37 56.88 62.77 68.35 73.55 78.56 83.43 88.21 92.97
Total expenditure 0.00 3.72 5.43 6.86 8.40 10.10 12.01 14.14 16.47 19.01 21.72 24.56 27.52 30.57
  Total consumption 0.00 -1.32 -1.81 -1.98 -1.68 -0.94 0.19 1.69 3.47 5.49 7.69 10.01 12.45 14.95
      Private consumption 0.00 -1.68 -2.85 -3.48 -3.54 -3.10 -2.21 -0.93 0.65 2.47 4.47 6.59 8.81 11.09
      Public consumption 0.00 -0.58 0.06 0.53 1.28 2.36 3.78 5.52 7.54 9.79 12.24 14.82 17.51 20.29
  Total investment 0.00 23.10 27.37 29.43 31.39 33.44 35.69 38.18 40.93 43.92 47.14 50.52 54.06 57.72
      Private investment 0.00 -1.20 -0.04 1.61 3.54 5.67 8.01 10.57 13.35 16.31 19.48 22.81 26.29 29.89
      Public investment 0.00 46.88 51.61 52.19 53.21 54.76 56.82 59.36 62.33 65.66 69.28 73.11 77.11 81.25
  Exports of goods and NFS 0.00 8.61 21.68 37.98 56.67 76.97 98.09 119.39 139.65 158.89 176.81 193.39 208.47 222.31
Poverty rate
1 (2000=44.2%)
   Poverty headcount index (survey data) 0.00 -0.36 -1.51 -3.41 -6.02 -9.05 -11.86 -14.83 -17.93 -20.60 -23.04 -25.19 -27.37 -29.10
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 0.00 -0.14 -0.65 -1.37 -2.20 -3.10 -4.00 -4.88 -5.69 -6.44 -7.11 -7.72 -8.27 -8.76
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 0.00 -0.29 -1.29 -2.70 -4.33 -6.05 -7.76 -9.40 -10.90 -12.28 -13.52 -14.66 -15.68 -16.61
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.8 0.00 -0.51 -2.29 -4.77 -7.58 -10.48 -13.30 -15.94 -18.33 -20.52 -22.50 -24.32 -25.99 -27.55
External Sector (% of GDP)
1
Current account 0.00 0.57 0.00 -0.26 -0.42 -0.54 -0.61 -0.65 -0.69 -0.72 -0.73 -0.73 -0.74 -0.74
    Trade balance 0.00 -4.39 -5.01 -5.30 -5.49 -5.61 -5.68 -5.70 -5.73 -5.73 -5.72 -5.69 -5.67 -5.65
       Exports of goods and NFS 0.00 1.19 2.33 3.28 3.96 4.40 4.68 4.85 4.94 5.00 5.04 5.07 5.10 5.14
       Imports of goods and NFS 0.00 5.58 7.34 8.59 9.45 10.01 10.36 10.55 10.67 10.73 10.75 10.76 10.77 10.79
    Private unrequited transfers 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.10 -0.15 -0.21 -0.26 -0.32 -0.38 -0.43
    Income (net) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
       Public 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
       Private 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Aid, total 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
    Other current account flows (net) 0.00 -0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.35
Capital account 0.00 -1.08 0.00 0.48 0.80 1.01 1.15 1.23 1.30 1.35 1.37 1.38 1.38 1.39
    Private borrowing 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06
    Public borrowing 0.00 -1.08 0.00 0.48 0.79 1.01 1.15 1.24 1.32 1.37 1.40 1.42 1.43 1.45
    Errors and omissions 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Government Sector (% of GDP)
1
Total revenue 0.00 6.25 6.47 6.60 6.67 6.70 6.70 6.69 6.67 6.65 6.63 6.60 6.59 6.59
    Domestic taxes 0.00 0.08 -0.06 -0.20 -0.31 -0.40 -0.46 -0.52 -0.56 -0.59 -0.62 -0.65 -0.67 -0.67
    Indirect taxes on imports 0.00 1.17 1.54 1.80 1.98 2.09 2.17 2.21 2.23 2.24 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.26
    Foreign aid (Grants) 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
       Food aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
       Nonfood aid 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Total expenditure 0.00 5.19 6.48 7.08 7.47 7.71 7.86 7.95 8.00 8.03 8.04 8.03 8.03 8.04
    Consumption 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.22
     Investment 0.00 5.18 6.34 6.89 7.25 7.49 7.65 7.74 7.80 7.84 7.86 7.87 7.88 7.89
     Interest payments 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07
        Payments on domestic debt 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08
        Payments on foreign debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Overall fiscal balance 0.00 1.08 0.00 -0.48 -0.79 -1.01 -1.15 -1.24 -1.32 -1.37 -1.40 -1.42 -1.43 -1.45
Total financing 0.00 -1.08 0.00 0.48 0.79 1.01 1.15 1.24 1.32 1.37 1.40 1.42 1.43 1.45
    Foreign financing 0.00 -1.08 0.00 0.48 0.79 1.01 1.15 1.24 1.32 1.37 1.40 1.42 1.43 1.45
    Domestic borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Prices and Exchange Rates
1
Composite good price (% change) 0.00 -2.06 -2.45 -2.71 -2.70 -2.53 -2.24 -1.87 -1.46 -1.06 -0.69 -0.36 -0.06 0.18
Nominal exchange rate (% change) 0.00 0.23 0.15 0.20 0.26 0.32 0.39 0.46 0.49 0.54 0.59 0.61 0.68 0.75
Real exchange rate (% change) 0.00 2.29 2.60 2.90 2.96 2.85 2.63 2.33 1.94 1.61 1.27 0.97 0.75 0.57
Memorandum items
1
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.00 1.41 2.71 3.03 3.45 3.69 3.76 3.71 3.55 3.33 3.09 2.87 2.57 2.32
Real disposable income per capita (% change) 0.00 0.66 2.29 3.30 3.89 4.22 4.31 4.23 3.96 3.68 3.34 3.01 2.68 2.36
Private savings rate (% of GDP) 0.00 0.09 0.65 1.40 2.16 2.92 3.63 4.28 4.85 5.35 5.78 6.15 6.46 6.70
Real private consumption per capita (% change) 0.00 0.30 1.16 1.95 2.52 2.89 3.07 3.09 2.98 2.81 2.59 2.34 2.12 1.89
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.00 -0.07 0.03 0.18 0.31 0.43 0.53 0.62 0.71 0.79 0.87 0.94 1.03 1.12
Private investment (% of total investment) 0.00 -9.76 -10.10 -9.67 -9.31 -9.04 -8.83 -8.68 -8.55 -8.45 -8.36 -8.27 -8.18 -8.09
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.00 7.93 8.74 8.90 9.00 9.06 9.10 9.12 9.14 9.15 9.15 9.15 9.15 9.16
   Health (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Education (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Food aid (% of total revenue) 0.00 -1.72 -1.49 -1.35 -1.27 -1.21 -1.17 -1.14 -1.12 -1.11 -1.10 -1.09 -1.08 -1.08
Food aid (% of total foreign aid) 0.00 -11.25 -11.25 -11.25 -11.25 -11.25 -11.25 -11.25 -11.25 -11.25 -11.25 -11.25 -11.25 -11.25
Nonfood aid (% of total public investment) 0.00 9.51 6.50 5.95 5.65 5.49 5.40 5.35 5.34 5.33 5.33 5.35 5.36 5.36
Nonfood aid (% of total foreign aid) 0.00 11.25 11.25 11.25 11.25 11.25 11.25 11.25 11.25 11.25 11.25 11.25 11.25 11.25
Domestic debt (% of GDP) 0.00 0.19 0.10 0.01 -0.17 -0.41 -0.69 -1.00 -1.31 -1.62 -1.92 -2.20 -2.46 -2.69
External debt (% of GDP) 0.00 -0.60 -0.59 -0.11 0.44 0.98 1.46 1.85 2.16 2.42 2.62 2.75 2.89 3.06
Interest payments on external public debt (% of exports) 0.00 -0.29 -0.86 -1.56 -2.40 -3.34 -4.36 -5.42 -6.45 -7.42 -8.32 -9.14 -9.85 -10.48
Degree of openness (total trade in % of GDP) 0.00 6.76 9.67 11.87 13.41 14.42 15.04 15.40 15.61 15.73 15.79 15.84 15.88 15.93
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.39 0.42




Permanent Increase of 5 Percentage Points in Aid-GDP Ratio
(Percentage deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real Sector
Total resources 0.00 7.01 11.03 14.54 18.46 22.98 28.10 18.89 21.77 24.70 27.40 30.00 32.35 34.42
    Gross domestic product at market prices 0.00 -1.39 -0.65 0.06 1.45 3.54 6.29 6.89 11.97 16.79 21.11 25.03 28.46 31.38
    Imports of goods and NFS (inclusive of tariffs) 0.00 35.61 55.00 74.35 94.65 115.95 137.96 81.70 74.58 68.27 62.58 58.01 54.44 51.69
Total expenditure 0.00 7.00 11.04 14.50 18.47 22.95 28.06 18.93 21.75 24.68 27.41 29.98 32.35 34.45
  Total consumption 0.00 -2.64 -3.54 -3.91 -3.44 -2.20 -0.24 4.28 9.69 14.55 18.89 22.73 26.06 28.86
      Private consumption 0.00 -3.27 -5.61 -7.01 -7.43 -6.99 -5.77 1.24 7.32 12.40 16.85 20.72 24.04 26.78
      Public consumption 0.00 -1.39 0.17 1.27 2.88 5.12 7.99 8.71 13.11 17.61 21.77 25.54 28.87 31.75
  Total investment 0.00 43.27 53.51 58.29 63.03 68.07 73.69 18.07 19.41 23.44 27.33 31.09 34.67 37.95
      Private investment 0.00 -2.43 -0.13 3.22 7.02 11.20 15.64 21.60 25.17 28.52 32.20 36.19 40.28 44.22
      Public investment 0.00 88.01 100.93 103.35 106.89 111.73 118.01 15.36 14.94 19.44 23.42 26.93 30.01 32.64
  Exports of goods and NFS 0.00 17.77 47.40 88.46 142.28 209.33 290.99 315.59 303.88 277.47 246.43 215.36 186.48 160.84
Poverty rate
1 (2000=44.2%)
   Poverty headcount index (survey data) 0.00 -0.57 -2.51 -5.91 -10.18 -15.48 -20.47 -26.12 -29.07 -30.52 -30.93 -30.60 -29.87 -28.38
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 0.00 -0.25 -1.10 -2.35 -3.88 -5.54 -7.30 -9.38 -9.76 -9.85 -9.70 -9.36 -8.88 -8.33
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 0.00 -0.49 -2.18 -4.62 -7.52 -10.58 -13.71 -17.26 -17.94 -18.17 -18.03 -17.58 -16.92 -16.11
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.8 0.00 -0.87 -3.86 -8.08 -12.86 -17.67 -22.31 -27.24 -28.29 -28.82 -28.93 -28.68 -28.16 -27.42
External Sector (% of GDP)
1
Current account 0.00 1.43 0.27 -0.20 -0.43 -0.59 -0.65 -0.03 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.32 0.28 0.25
    Trade balance 0.00 -8.52 -9.78 -10.35 -10.66 -10.88 -10.99 -0.55 0.00 0.12 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.27
       Exports of goods and NFS 0.00 2.49 5.10 7.62 9.87 11.82 13.61 12.82 10.37 8.13 6.32 4.92 3.83 2.99
       Imports of goods and NFS 0.00 11.01 14.88 17.97 20.52 22.70 24.60 13.36 10.37 8.01 6.13 4.68 3.57 2.72
    Private unrequited transfers 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.03 -0.03 -0.11 -0.21 -0.19 -0.31 -0.40 -0.46 -0.51 -0.53 -0.55
    Income (net) 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08
       Public 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
       Private 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Aid, total 0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Other current account flows (net) 0.00 -0.15 -0.03 0.10 0.23 0.38 0.52 0.70 0.67 0.62 0.57 0.52 0.48 0.44
Capital account 0.00 -2.68 -0.51 0.38 0.80 1.11 1.23 0.06 -0.72 -0.72 -0.67 -0.60 -0.53 -0.46
    Private borrowing 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08
    Public borrowing 0.00 -2.69 -0.52 0.37 0.80 1.12 1.26 0.09 -0.68 -0.66 -0.60 -0.53 -0.45 -0.39
    Errors and omissions 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Government Sector (% of GDP)
1
Total revenue 0.00 12.58 13.21 13.69 14.07 14.42 14.73 1.59 1.37 1.16 0.94 0.73 0.57 0.44
    Domestic taxes 0.00 0.27 0.09 -0.07 -0.22 -0.33 -0.42 -1.21 -0.80 -0.52 -0.34 -0.25 -0.17 -0.13
    Indirect taxes on imports 0.00 2.30 3.11 3.76 4.29 4.75 5.15 2.80 2.17 1.67 1.28 0.98 0.75 0.57
    Foreign aid (Grants) 0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
       Food aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
       Nonfood aid 0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total expenditure 0.00 9.85 12.70 14.00 14.88 15.49 15.93 1.74 0.67 0.47 0.33 0.21 0.12 0.06
    Consumption 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.41 0.49 0.54 0.57 0.61 0.37 0.26 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.10
     Investment 0.00 9.83 12.44 13.60 14.42 14.99 15.42 1.18 0.40 0.34 0.29 0.23 0.18 0.15
     Interest payments 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.13 -0.15 -0.17 -0.18 -0.19
        Payments on domestic debt 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12
        Payments on foreign debt 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
Overall fiscal balance 0.00 2.69 0.52 -0.37 -0.80 -1.12 -1.26 -0.09 0.68 0.66 0.60 0.53 0.45 0.38
Total financing 0.00 -2.69 -0.52 0.37 0.80 1.12 1.26 0.09 -0.68 -0.66 -0.60 -0.53 -0.45 -0.38
    Foreign financing 0.00 -2.69 -0.52 0.37 0.80 1.12 1.26 0.09 -0.68 -0.66 -0.60 -0.53 -0.45 -0.39
    Domestic borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Prices and Exchange Rates
1
Composite good price (% change) 0.00 -3.91 -4.53 -5.01 -5.14 -5.05 -4.89 0.02 2.44 3.43 4.18 4.65 4.82 4.70
Nominal exchange rate (% change) 0.00 0.47 0.21 0.11 0.06 -0.07 -0.19 0.97 1.13 1.42 1.73 1.92 2.02 1.96
Real exchange rate (% change) 0.00 4.38 4.73 5.12 5.20 4.98 4.70 0.95 -1.31 -2.01 -2.44 -2.73 -2.80 -2.74
Memorandum items
1
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.00 2.37 5.36 5.80 6.67 7.32 7.79 0.60 2.72 1.22 -0.19 -1.17 -1.88 -2.27
Real disposable income per capita (% change) 0.00 1.14 3.88 5.82 7.24 8.16 8.95 10.99 1.95 0.26 -1.11 -2.20 -2.89 -3.24
Private savings rate (% of GDP) 0.00 0.15 0.91 2.10 3.42 4.77 6.22 10.42 9.44 8.60 7.78 6.88 5.97 5.11
Real private consumption per capita (% change) 0.00 0.52 1.97 3.40 4.60 5.45 6.14 7.33 3.56 1.42 0.00 -1.05 -1.74 -2.15
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.00 -0.11 0.06 0.34 0.60 0.81 0.99 1.57 1.37 1.20 1.11 1.11 1.17 1.26
Private investment (% of total investment) 0.00 -15.78 -16.40 -15.66 -15.09 -14.69 -14.47 1.30 2.11 1.81 1.70 1.75 1.89 2.08
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.00 13.74 15.34 15.64 15.84 16.00 16.14 1.27 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.33 0.28 0.25
   Health (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Education (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Food aid (% of total revenue) 0.00 -3.02 -2.67 -2.46 -2.34 -2.27 -2.23 -0.30 -0.25 -0.21 -0.17 -0.13 -0.11 -0.08
Food aid (% of total foreign aid) 0.00 -17.31 -17.31 -17.31 -17.31 -17.31 -17.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nonfood aid (% of total public investment) 0.00 16.44 10.38 9.27 8.59 8.15 7.79 -3.60 -1.25 -1.07 -0.90 -0.72 -0.57 -0.45
Nonfood aid (% of total foreign aid) 0.00 17.31 17.31 17.31 17.31 17.31 17.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Domestic debt (% of GDP) 0.00 0.46 0.18 -0.03 -0.39 -0.85 -1.36 -1.37 -2.19 -2.81 -3.24 -3.55 -3.75 -3.86
External debt (% of GDP) 0.00 -1.58 -2.25 -2.01 -1.79 -1.75 -2.01 -1.62 -4.34 -6.52 -8.09 -9.24 -10.00 -10.49
Interest payments on external public debt (% of exports) 0.00 -0.56 -1.58 -2.71 -3.97 -5.35 -6.79 -7.85 -8.69 -9.34 -9.76 -9.94 -9.89 -9.62
Degree of openness (total trade in % of GDP) 0.00 13.50 19.98 25.59 30.39 34.52 38.21 26.18 20.73 16.13 12.45 9.59 7.39 5.70
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.24 0.31 0.38 0.44 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.59




Permanent Increase of 5 Percentage Points in Aid-GDP Ratio, Corresponding to an increase  of 11.3 Percentage Point in the Nonfood Aid to Total Aid Ratio
(Percentage deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real Sector
Total resources 0.00 7.01 11.03 14.54 18.46 22.98 28.10 18.89 21.77 24.70 27.40 30.00 32.35 34.42
    Gross domestic product at market prices 0.00 -1.39 -0.65 0.06 1.45 3.54 6.29 6.89 11.97 16.79 21.11 25.03 28.46 31.38
    Imports of goods and NFS (inclusive of tariffs) 0.00 35.61 55.00 74.35 94.65 115.95 137.96 81.70 74.58 68.27 62.58 58.01 54.44 51.69
Total expenditure 0.00 7.00 11.04 14.50 18.47 22.95 28.06 18.93 21.75 24.68 27.41 29.98 32.35 34.45
  Total consumption 0.00 -2.64 -3.54 -3.91 -3.44 -2.20 -0.24 4.28 9.69 14.55 18.89 22.73 26.06 28.86
      Private consumption 0.00 -3.27 -5.61 -7.01 -7.43 -6.99 -5.77 1.24 7.32 12.40 16.85 20.72 24.04 26.78
      Public consumption 0.00 -1.39 0.17 1.27 2.88 5.12 7.99 8.71 13.11 17.61 21.77 25.54 28.87 31.75
  Total investment 0.00 43.27 53.51 58.29 63.03 68.07 73.69 18.07 19.41 23.44 27.33 31.09 34.67 37.95
      Private investment 0.00 -2.43 -0.13 3.22 7.02 11.20 15.64 21.60 25.17 28.52 32.20 36.19 40.28 44.22
      Public investment 0.00 88.01 100.93 103.35 106.89 111.73 118.01 15.36 14.94 19.44 23.42 26.93 30.01 32.64
  Exports of goods and NFS 0.00 17.77 47.40 88.46 142.28 209.33 290.99 315.59 303.88 277.47 246.43 215.36 186.48 160.84
Poverty rate
1 (2000=44.2%)
   Poverty headcount index (survey data) 0.00 -0.57 -2.51 -5.91 -10.18 -15.48 -20.47 -26.12 -29.07 -30.52 -30.93 -30.60 -29.87 -28.38
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 0.00 -0.25 -1.10 -2.35 -3.88 -5.54 -7.30 -9.38 -9.76 -9.85 -9.70 -9.36 -8.88 -8.33
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 0.00 -0.49 -2.18 -4.62 -7.52 -10.58 -13.71 -17.26 -17.94 -18.17 -18.03 -17.58 -16.92 -16.11
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.8 0.00 -0.87 -3.86 -8.08 -12.86 -17.67 -22.31 -27.24 -28.29 -28.82 -28.93 -28.68 -28.16 -27.42
External Sector (% of GDP)
1
Current account 0.00 1.43 0.27 -0.20 -0.43 -0.59 -0.65 -0.03 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.32 0.28 0.25
    Trade balance 0.00 -8.52 -9.78 -10.35 -10.66 -10.88 -10.99 -0.55 0.00 0.12 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.27
       Exports of goods and NFS 0.00 2.49 5.10 7.62 9.87 11.82 13.61 12.82 10.37 8.13 6.32 4.92 3.83 2.99
       Imports of goods and NFS 0.00 11.01 14.88 17.97 20.52 22.70 24.60 13.36 10.37 8.01 6.13 4.68 3.57 2.72
    Private unrequited transfers 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.03 -0.03 -0.11 -0.21 -0.19 -0.31 -0.40 -0.46 -0.51 -0.53 -0.55
    Income (net) 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08
       Public 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
       Private 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Aid, total 0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
    Other current account flows (net) 0.00 -0.15 -0.03 0.10 0.23 0.38 0.52 0.70 0.67 0.62 0.57 0.52 0.48 0.44
Capital account 0.00 -2.68 -0.51 0.38 0.80 1.11 1.23 0.06 -0.72 -0.72 -0.67 -0.60 -0.53 -0.46
    Private borrowing 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08
    Public borrowing 0.00 -2.69 -0.52 0.37 0.80 1.12 1.26 0.09 -0.68 -0.66 -0.60 -0.53 -0.45 -0.39
    Errors and omissions 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Government Sector (% of GDP)
1
Total revenue 0.00 12.58 13.21 13.69 14.07 14.42 14.73 1.59 1.37 1.16 0.94 0.73 0.57 0.44
    Domestic taxes 0.00 0.27 0.09 -0.07 -0.22 -0.33 -0.42 -1.21 -0.80 -0.52 -0.34 -0.25 -0.17 -0.13
    Indirect taxes on imports 0.00 2.30 3.11 3.76 4.29 4.75 5.15 2.80 2.17 1.67 1.28 0.98 0.75 0.57
    Foreign aid (Grants) 0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
       Food aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
       Nonfood aid 0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total expenditure 0.00 9.85 12.70 14.00 14.88 15.49 15.93 1.74 0.67 0.47 0.33 0.21 0.12 0.06
    Consumption 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.41 0.49 0.54 0.57 0.61 0.37 0.26 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.10
     Investment 0.00 9.83 12.44 13.60 14.42 14.99 15.42 1.18 0.40 0.34 0.29 0.23 0.18 0.15
     Interest payments 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.13 -0.15 -0.17 -0.18 -0.19
        Payments on domestic debt 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12
        Payments on foreign debt 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
Overall fiscal balance 0.00 2.69 0.52 -0.37 -0.80 -1.12 -1.26 -0.09 0.68 0.66 0.60 0.53 0.45 0.38
Total financing 0.00 -2.69 -0.52 0.37 0.80 1.12 1.26 0.09 -0.68 -0.66 -0.60 -0.53 -0.45 -0.38
    Foreign financing 0.00 -2.69 -0.52 0.37 0.80 1.12 1.26 0.09 -0.68 -0.66 -0.60 -0.53 -0.45 -0.39
    Domestic borrowing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Prices and Exchange Rates
1
Composite good price (% change) 0.00 -3.91 -4.53 -5.01 -5.14 -5.05 -4.89 0.02 2.44 3.43 4.18 4.65 4.82 4.70
Nominal exchange rate (% change) 0.00 0.47 0.21 0.11 0.06 -0.07 -0.19 0.97 1.13 1.42 1.73 1.92 2.02 1.96
Real exchange rate (% change) 0.00 4.38 4.73 5.12 5.20 4.98 4.70 0.95 -1.31 -2.01 -2.44 -2.73 -2.80 -2.74
Memorandum items
1
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 0.00 2.37 5.36 5.80 6.67 7.32 7.79 0.60 2.72 1.22 -0.19 -1.17 -1.88 -2.27
Real disposable income per capita (% change) 0.00 1.14 3.88 5.82 7.24 8.16 8.95 10.99 1.95 0.26 -1.11 -2.20 -2.89 -3.24
Private savings rate (% of GDP) 0.00 0.15 0.91 2.10 3.42 4.77 6.22 10.42 9.44 8.60 7.78 6.88 5.97 5.11
Real private consumption per capita (% change) 0.00 0.52 1.97 3.40 4.60 5.45 6.14 7.33 3.56 1.42 0.00 -1.05 -1.74 -2.15
Private investment (% of GDP) 0.00 -0.11 0.06 0.34 0.60 0.81 0.99 1.57 1.37 1.20 1.11 1.11 1.17 1.26
Private investment (% of total investment) 0.00 -15.78 -16.40 -15.66 -15.09 -14.69 -14.47 1.30 2.11 1.81 1.70 1.75 1.89 2.08
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 0.00 13.74 15.34 15.64 15.84 16.00 16.14 1.27 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.33 0.28 0.25
   Health (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Education (% of public investment) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Food aid (% of total revenue) 0.00 -3.02 -2.67 -2.46 -2.34 -2.27 -2.23 -0.30 -0.25 -0.21 -0.17 -0.13 -0.11 -0.08
Food aid (% of total foreign aid) 0.00 -17.31 -17.31 -17.31 -17.31 -17.31 -17.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nonfood aid (% of total public investment) 0.00 16.44 10.38 9.27 8.59 8.15 7.79 -3.60 -1.25 -1.07 -0.90 -0.72 -0.57 -0.45
Nonfood aid (% of total foreign aid) 0.00 17.31 17.31 17.31 17.31 17.31 17.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Domestic debt (% of GDP) 0.00 0.46 0.18 -0.03 -0.39 -0.85 -1.36 -1.37 -2.19 -2.81 -3.24 -3.55 -3.75 -3.86
External debt (% of GDP) 0.00 -1.58 -2.25 -2.01 -1.79 -1.75 -2.01 -1.62 -4.34 -6.52 -8.09 -9.24 -10.00 -10.49
Interest payments on external public debt (% of exports) 0.00 -0.56 -1.58 -2.71 -3.97 -5.35 -6.79 -7.85 -8.69 -9.34 -9.76 -9.94 -9.89 -9.62
Degree of openness (total trade in % of GDP) 0.00 13.50 19.98 25.59 30.39 34.52 38.21 26.18 20.73 16.13 12.45 9.59 7.39 5.70
Educated labor (in % of population) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.24 0.31 0.38 0.44 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.59




Temporary Increase by 10 Percentage Points in Aid-GDP Ratio (2003-08), Leading to a 17.3 Percentage Point Increase in the Nonfood Aid to Total Aid Ratio
(Percentage deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)